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CASE NO. CV -02-00072 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT~S MOTION FOR 
LIMITED DISQUALIFICATION OF 
.roDGE/AND FURTHER BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTIO~ FORNEW 
TRIAL, 
:>lamtiffKyle Athay hereby provides the following points, authorities, and arguments in 
0PJ,OSi.1,OlI to the Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge and further provides additional 
brid'in/l D, opposition to Defendant's Motion for A New Trial. Pla:intiff contends the Motion for 
aN~,V' Tn ttl has no merit and the Motiol:t for Disqualification, having no underlying support, 
ShOllJJ aLo be denied. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Bt ause this tdal comt is in a far better position to weigh the persuasiveness of new trial 
martel l t',o Idaho appellate courts have consistently held that 'the trial court's grant or derual of 
MotlOllS for N~r Trial will be upheld unless the Court has manifestly abused the wide discretion 
BRIEF T .J OPF )SlTI0N TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LIMITED DlSQUALIFICA TION Of JUDGE! AND FURTHER 
BRIEF L"l Of'rOSITIO)-l TO MOTrON FOR NEW TRJAL - 1 
".-~--~-.-~-,--~--~~-..,----.-- .. ----- '." .. ,---_._---
IO/NOV/Ci 12: 4 . PM R. Jorgensen FAX No, [1 p, 
vested in j~. ]iVan'en v, Shm'P. 139 Idaho 599, 83 P 3d 733 (2003); Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idahp 
848,850,840 F.2d 392,394 (1992). 
When this Courts exercise of discretion is reviewed an appeal, the Supreme Court would 
inquire: 
(1) Whether the lower Court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) Whether the Court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applioable to specific choices; 
(3) Wb,ether the Court reached its decision by exercise ofreaso:o. Swallow 11. 
Emergency Medicine of Idaho. P.A.8, 138 Idaho 589,592,67 P.3d 68,71 (2003); 
t'hm Valley Shopping Center} Inc. v. Idaho Power Company. 119 Idaho 87;; 94. 
803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). , 
Tht~s. dris' Court's decision. on whether to grant'a new trial, is in the Court's discretion. It 
will not be reversed unless the Court has manifestly abu.sed the wide discretion vested in i:t,Jones ' 
v, PanhandLe j )istributing Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 792 P.2d 315 (1990); Litohfield v. Nelson 122 
Idaho 416, ~:j 5 P.2d 651 (Idaho App 1992). 
RULES AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
& Then ;s uo conduct which prevented the Defendant from receiving a fair trial. 
MotOl's for New Trial are gQVenled bylR.C.P 59(a). 
On tiLe i.6th day of September 2010, the Corut conducted a status conference with the 
parties where, ,1 the Court infonned the parties that it had discovered that oertain contact had 
OCCllITed be: reeD. the Court' 5 Deputy Courtroom Clerk Brandy Peck (previous reference to 
Brandy~,,;in:i was an error of the Plaintiff) and the Plaintiff. 
BRIEF IN OPl?OS~TION TO DEFENDANT'S MorrON FOR Ll1vl1ttD DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE/AND FURTIffiR 
BRIEF IN OPPOSLTiON TO MOTION FOR NEW TR1A.L," 2 
.. ,._-----
la/NOV/o3/WED 12:42 R. Jorgensen FAX No, (J o 6 p, 
The contact also included contact benveen Ms. Peck and the Dofendant's Sheriff Dale 
Stacy and his wife. The Court further illfon11ed the parties that it had discovered fue contact had 
occurred, had questioned Ms. Peck about it and i11Structed the contact to cease. 
Near the close of the status conferel1ce the Court ga'Ve counsel for both parties the 
opportunity to inquire further. Neither counsel made further inquiry of the Court concerning 
these matters. 
The Court represented that no confidential infonnation was conveyed from the parties to 
th.e Court or jury and th&r no infonnation was conveyed from the Court or j ury to the parties. 
It is not knoW!j aud understood exactly what the Defendant's position is. Defendant has 
yet to conneot the couduct to a reason far a new trial as set forth ill I.R.C.P. 59(a). L The 
Defondant must show th"t these I'irregularities" prevented the Defen.dant from. haVlng a fair. tlia1. 
There is absolute1yno cJnnection between what occurred between Kyle Athey arid Brandy Peck 
which pre'Vented Rich ,_:ountyUtah frOm receiving a frurtrial. 
Thero is abso "utdy no showing that the conduct effected, in any way, the fact fmding 
:function of the jury 
The-rei is at.;:;olu ~ely now showing that bias and prejudice requireme:qts ofIdaho Code of 
Judicial Conducl Can0Il 3B(6) has beel1 violated by the Court or its staff. 
LR.CJ'.5~(a) 1. d1dicatos thatifthe reason for a new trial is IR.C.P. 59(a) 1.. ie-
"irregularity ill the 1'1'0( :'edings" - the Motion must be accompanied by an Alfidavit setting forth 
in detail the f<,c:.ts relieJ upon in support of such Motion for A New TriaL 
Kyle /'ltnay h.u; iiled a.Tl Affidavit ilidicatillg the nature and extent ofsuch contact 
Nothing in that Affldavit would indicate that the contact effected the Court in any of its rulings 
:BRIEF IN OPPOSl :rON Tu DErEIDANT'S MOTION FOR LlMlTED DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE/AND FURTHER 
BRlEF IN OPFOSi rrON TG MOT ON FOR NEW 'JJ:<lAL ' 3 
.--,.,'-.--~---"~.--------- .. -._._-"-- ... _-_ .. __ ._-._---_._._---,---
2[1 [O/NOV/O R. Jorgensen l! 0, 
,}. 
norihe jur.fjn its tasks. Defeqdant has failed to file any other Affidavits stating ili detail the facts . 
upon whit;hit {plies in support of this Motion for A New Trial. 
Defellcmtmay contend that its only burden would be to show that misconduct occurred 
and th.tl the b-urden thereafter shifts 'to the Plaintiff to show that the conduct could' hot have 
effectfd thCi )utcome of the trial Slaathaug'V. Allstate Insurance Company 132 Idaho 705~ 979 
P.2d 107 (1999), 'The Plaintiff has done so. 
~.'I[oinformation has been supplied by the Defenda:nt suggesting that any extraneOl.is 
prejlJJ.ieial infonnation was improperly brought to the'jury's attention ar that.outside influence 
wr d3 irhpP?perly brought to be;ar an any juror . The jury has properly reached its verdict and ,the 
Court should deny Defendants Motion for A New Tdal. Myers 11, A.a. .Smith Harvestor Products 
. 1110,114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695 (Idaho App.) . 
. This case is different than that of Hinman v. Morrison-Knudsen Company" 115 Idaho 869, 
771 p ~2d 533 (1989). In :Hinman the bailiff had had a dllect influence and contact with the jury 
itselfm its deliberative and fact finding fUnction. There, the bailiff without authority from the 
. trial judge, denied the jUJY's request for certain material5. The denied 1ltaterialsapparently 
contained deposition transcripts which had been referred to in the trial and a copy of an 
administrative bulletin whlch. fOffiled the basis of the Plaintiffs .conttact claim. The Hinman trial 
court was com~ct in granting a new ttial..since there waS a legitimate question as to whether the 
actions of the bailiff couJ.d have had on the deliberative and fact finding function of the jury. 
In this case, the Defe:n.dcll1t makes a quanu'lm leap in logic .trom the.irregularity it claims 
to the assertions that tlus irregularity had any effect on the jury. It did not and the Defendant's 
Motion is meritless and fiivolous . 
. BFJEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR. L.lJl1:ltBD DISQUALIFICAUON OF JUDGE/A.ND FUR1.HER 
BRJEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL· 4 
5 
lO/NOV/O 12:43 t Jorgensen FAX No, 8 p, 
B. Defendant has waived any right to disqualify the Court for purposes of making further 
111Q:uiry of the Court. 
As discussed above, at the Court status conference on September 16, the Court afforded 
cOllnse. i he opportunity to make further inquiry about the matter. Defendant failed to make 
further illquiry even though it had full opportullity to do so. Now, after "1early six weeks the 
Defelliant seeks to disqualify the Court The Court's disclosure occurred on Septernber 16th• 
Yet Dde.ndant did not seek to disqualify the Court until October 22, 20 lO. Defendant did not 
file i .:l :f\iotion for New Trial until October 1,2010. Defendant never noticed this Motion up tor 
hear:ng Defendant fil~d an additiona~Motion for aNew Trial on October 22nd• This additional 
l\ICUQ'l is yet lObe supported by a single affidavit or memorandum. The Court and counsel are 
:ell co guess the facts and legal basis for this motion. 
Defendant is now engaged in nume1'OUS tactics to delay enforcement of the Judgment. 
Despite invitation, the Defendant has yet to provide the amount of "remaining ayailable 
1 ,roteeds ofsuc,h insurance" I.C 36-926. This would have been useful in tht;'· Court>s 
de\erm.illa6on entering Judgment. The Court was left to. aSSl1me that Defendant has available 
).:1l:Jurance proceeds in excess of the $500,000. 
Despite lpportunity the Defendant has failed to inquire, failed to subpeona, failed to 
depose, and fa} Jed to investigate. 
PLtmLlif filed his detailed Motion for Bntry of Judgment and Memorandum of Costs 01\ 
Au,t;rtlst ,3,.'.j10 Gust 8 days after the jury verdict), The Court had earlier set it for hearing on 
Aug.lSt 5 ~~OlO. The Defendant filed a Motion to Continue. Hearing was held on August 19, 
201Cl. 
BRIEF IN Ol'POS! nON TO DEFENDANT'S MonON FOR LlMITED DISQU.<\.UFXCATION OF JODGEfAND FURTHER 
BRlEF IN Ol'l:'OS~ nON to MOTION FOR NEW TRLAL. 5 
... ----~~----,~-----........ -.. -.-.. - " ...... ~----~ . ....;-.-----.- ., .. . 
20l0/NOV/03/WED 12: c PM Cr, R. ,Jorgensen FAXNo,208 P, 008 
Fdnce the entry afthe verdict Defendant's actions have been calculated to delay the 
procefdings in every possible way. 
Defendant's Motion to Disqualify the Court is not wen taken. It has as its solo purpose 
d.~lay of the proceedings. Since Defendant's counsel declined to inquire of the Court when they 
had a full and oomplete opportunity to do 80, it has waived such opportunity. Defendant cannot 
now use disqualification as a reason for its further inquiry of the Court. Defendant no'>", after six 
woeks, states, for the first time that it intends to subpoena records and examine, witnesses. 
Under the language ofLRC.P 59(a).1. there is no showing that the Defendant was 
t vented from having a fair trial. Further, there is no showing that wha.t occurred here is an 
e00f. 
. The Court', before disqualifYing itself, should review t1le Motion on its merits. See 
J .JDICATURB) Taking Disqualification Serious{v; Volume 92! Numer 1, July-August 2008 (See 
s,)ecifically foo1notes42, 43, {l;tl,d 44). 
K:aufinan v. American Family Mu~wl Insurance Co., 601 F3d. 1088 (lOth Cir.2010) WaB a 
case where one party sought to have investigative and "full-blown discovery" into 3n ex parte 
cummi.L:ication between counsel and theCoures law clerk. 
Mere specUlation that an ex parte contact has dccurred or that a judge W'ag affected 
by it, however. does not warrant relief or further investigation .. See West v. Orand 
Co., 967 F2d 362, 367 (10th Cir.1992) (denying due process claim becausepaIty's 
"contention" that the Corrunissioners based their decision on ex parte 
comrnmllcations [was] pure speculation. .. ")., 
In this case, the single e):: parte contact that occurred was promptly disclosed to 
Silvern. ·Furthemlore, despite the district court's conclusion tbat the contact was 
ha:rmlt:lSs, it lievertbeless awarded Silvem reasonable fees because of it. Thus, 
there is no basis for Silvern's claim that fwther disclosure or investigation of that 
conununication is nect;ls$ary. 
B. JEF IN' ,PPOSmOh TO DEFENDANT'S MOTrON FOR LlM1l'ED DISQUALIFlCATION OF JUDGEI AAlJ) FURTHER 
J' (JElF IN (JPPOSITION TO I\-tQTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 6 
-h~'io j ------- -.. -.----.----- - .---.------------- .. 
I :cL' R. F }f 0, 6 p, 
Moreover, Silvern's claim that other similar OJ.~ even more ominous contacts may 
have occurred is pure speculation. fudeed, in its motion for sanctions, Silvem did 
not identifY any oth.er contact it feared may have taken place. snggesting only that 
the possibility of one improper commurucation required the court to order flow-
blown discovery to determine whether any other ex parte communications had 
occurred. On such a record, we cannot say that the district court erred in refusing 
to order such an investigation into the possibility of other ex parte contacts. 
6'11 F3d at 1095, 1096 
A (OJ lxlr.llte clelk's" ex parte contact with a criminal Co-Defendant did not require recusal, 
I' h' fe the: e w ,5 no evidence that the judge acted inappropriately or that trial court was biased in 
L'!or 0[(.0-1 ·t'.lendan.ts and against Defendant. State v. Mi1111J, 769 So.2d 44, 1997-1500 (La. 
A IP, 4 Cir. :( ICO). 
As 11 te.1. th.e Court, prior to deciding whether to disqualifY itself should review the 
1] ,cion C'l\', \1, yto determine its merit. There is no merit to the Motion. There is no connection 
p .. twet ' .. dl, . a, egod "irregularity in the proceedings", and the Defendants failure to get a fair 
trim, RI w ,fthe Motion reveals only one conclusjon .. The underlying Motion for a New Trial 
h .£ LiGllt:d' , ilence the Defendant's attempt to disqualify the Court, is only a maneuvtlr and 
, ra og '{ Il} delay the proceedings. Defendant has had over six weeks to subpoena; examine, and 
!, iv,Sllgat . It has done nothing, The contact between the Plaintiff and Brandy Peck, while 
, ..• g cita; ~,did 110t, in any way, af'fectthe Defendant's right to receive a fair trial. Accordingly, 




LRC.f 61 indicates that a new trial shall not be granted unless refusal to grant the. new 
tri.lL is "'mcOT, istent with sUbstantialj·ustice". TIle rule further directs the Court to dim:egard any 
HRIEf fN OPPC:';' L'JN TO DEFENDANT'S MonON FORLIMlTED DISQOAUfICA1ION OFJUDGE/AND FuR'ffiER 
BRIEF IN OPI'l' _ 1'1 0N TO MOTrON FOR NEW TRIAL - 7 
': 44 . R. Jorgensen No, 8 6 p, Ol I] 
err, ,r or defect in the proceeding which does not effect the "substantial rights of the parties". 
Error which does not affect a substantial right of the party is considered harmless and is 
b b,~ disregarded. L&L Furnitute Mart Inc v, Boise Water Corporation 120 Idaho 107,813 P.2d 
918 (Idwo App. 1991); Wood v. State Department afHealth & Welfare, 127 Idaho 515,903 P.2d 
i 102 (IIJaho App. 1995), 
Defendant has failed to show that denial of a new trial would be inconsistent with 
SlLbE ::anfial jutitice. Further, Defendant has failed to show, and CIllIDot show, that the alleged ex 
,lwe and purely social contact affected the "sub~tantialrights" ofRlch County. 
The definition ofhanI.lless error and the meaning of substantial rights is aptly described 111 
J1;tiCt; Rutlecge's opinion ill Kotteakos v. United Sta~es, 66 S.Ct.1239, 328 U.S. 750, 90 L. Ed 
i 57 i)946) 
It comes do\l,'ll on its face to a very plain admonition: "Do nat betechdcal, where 
technicality does llotreally hurt the party whose rights in the trial and in its 
oLltcome .the technicality affects", of * '" 
. :asie:r was the command to make, than it has been always to observe. This, in part 
,ecaUStl it is general; but in part also because the mscrinlination it requires is one 
)f judgment transcending confinement by fonnula or precise rule, * *. * That 
faculty cannot ever be wholly imprisoned in words, much less upon such a 
..;riterion as what are. only technical. wha.t substantial rights; and what really affects 
the latter hurtfully. Judgment, tb,e play of impression and conviction along with 
intelligence, varies with judges and also' with circumstance. What may be 
technical for one is substantial for another; what millor and un:im.portant :in one 
setting 1S crucial itl another . 
. ,* II< 
If, when allij said and done. the conviction js sure that the I:mor did not influence 
the jury. or had but vel}! slight. effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, 
except perhaps where departure is frOl1.1 a constitutional nonn or a specific 
command of Congress, >I< '" * But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after 
pondering all that happel1ed without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 
Bl< : i /:" IN OPl )S' ,JON TO DeFENDANT S MOTION FOR L1M1TED DISQUALrFICA nON OF JUDGE! AND FURTHBR 
BF. :F IN OF] 0,<: ('JON TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 8. 
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that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to 
conclude that substantial rights were not affected .. The inquiry cannot be merely 
whether ther:e was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by 
the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itselfhad substantial influence. 
(Emphasis added) 
It's clear the harmless error notion of Rule 61 teaches that the proceedings are, not to be 
disturbed because of an error that prejudiced no one. Universal Power Systems v. Godfather's 
Pizza, 818 F 2d 667,671 (C.A. 8th). 
Here there is no indication the ex parte commUnications reached the Court or the jury, let 
alone influenced it. 
CPNCLUSION 
The Court ~hould review Defendant's Motiml for a New Trial It has no merit lID.d should . I 
be summru.i1y denied. 
The Motion to Disqualify, which stands 011 the shoulders of a meritless motion, should 
like"rlse be deni ed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
, ,{()RGENSEN ~._ 
BRIEF IN OPF .)SlTION TO D:EFEl'<'DANT'S MOTION FOR LlMlT'ED DJSQUALIFICATION OF JUDGRlAND fURTIfl3R 
BRIEF J:N OPT' ,)SITION TO MOTION FOR NSW TIUAL - 9 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ;eltifY that 011 the i... day of November, 2010, r served a tnte and correct copy 
oftlle foregoin,_; pleading on the following person by the means so indicated: 
[~irst Class 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[~acsimile 
.../ 
[ t fPirst Class 
[ J Hand-Delivery 
L ..]4:"acsimile 
Peter Stirba 
STlRBA AND HATHA WA Y 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City; Utah S411O~081 0 
Far:; (SOl) 364-8335 
AJan J oMston 
Pn<E HERNDON 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls~ ID 83403-2949 
Fax: (:208) 518-~'447' 
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lj I ( 
N 0 lJ / i) 41 LUI U/ T H U llJ: 2 6 AM ST & 
ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709) 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. BOK 2949 
Idaho Falls. ID 83403~2949 
Telephone: (208) 528-6444 
Telefax: (208) 528-6447 
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No, 3118) 
R. DLAKI!. HAMILTON (Utah Dar No. 11:)95) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
2] 5 South State Street, Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City. UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Telefax: (801) 364~8355 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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OE,.UTY _______ CASfNI. 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF' THE, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
KYLEATHAY, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-02-000n 
v. 
RICH COUNTY, UTAH, 
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIl<1FS' 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LIMITED 
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE/AND 
FURTHER BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Defendant. 
Defendant Ric,h Connty, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits this Motion 
1 
MOTION TO S'TIUKB 
NOV/04l2010/TIIU 10: AM IRBA & IATES lk 801 p, 003 
to Strike Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification of 
Judge/and Further Brief in Opposition to Motion for a New Trial for the reasons set forth in the 
accompanying Memorandum. 
DATED this ___ day of November. 2010. 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
PETER STIRBA 
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ttky ofNovember~ 2010 r caased to be served 
a 1:rtle copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIF'FS' BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LIMtTED DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGE/AND FURTHER BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL by 
th~ lU(;>j:hOQ indioat .. d b .. low, to th~ following: 
Attorney at Law 
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4 
P.O. Box 4904 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES. P.A. 
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Honorable Mitchell V .. /. Brown 
District Judge Resident Chambers 
P.O. Box 775 
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
()9u.s. MWl, Pu,,;ll:1gc l'lcjJruJ 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
}fju.s. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
w U.S. Mail; Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
N 
ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709) 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P ,0. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls. 1D 83403-2949 
Telephone: (208) 528-6444 
Telefax: (208) 528~6447 
PE1ER STIRBA (utah Bar No. 3118) 
K, BLAKE HAMILTON (Ut1111 BllJ. Nu. 11391) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, tJT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Teldax: (801) 364-8355 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




meH COUNTY, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
M£MORAlJY)\JM f1'l SUPPORt OF MO'l'iON TO STitl'kE 
Case No. CV-02-000n 
MEMORANDUM IN S'UPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
LIMITED DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGE/AND FURTHER. BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
NOV/U4/LU1U/THU lU:L~ AM :511J.::BP, &. ,o,0:5UClfUE:5 AX No, p, UUo 
Defendant Rich County, by and through undersigned counsel, horeby submits this 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant'1S Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge/and Further Brief in Opposition to 
Motion for a New Trial for the reasons set forth herein. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. On October 1, 2010, Defendant Rich ("otmty tIled a Motion for aNew TriaL 
2. On October 13,2010 Pla.intiffflled a Reply Brief to Defendant's Motion for a 
New Trial opposing Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
3. On October 22, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion for Limited Disqualification of 
Judge, 
4. The Hearing for the Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge was set for 
hearing on November 4. 2010. at 2:30 in Paris, Idaho. 
5. On November 2, 2010, Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for New Trial as a response to Plaintiff's brief filed October 13, 2010. 
6. On November 3> 2010, Defendant received Plaintiff s Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualitlcation of Judge/and Further Briefin Opposition to 
Motion for New Trial, 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification 
of Judge/and Further Brief in Opposition to Motion for New Trial, which can effectively be 
broken down into two separate briefs. Each brief is deficient by itself and should be stric.ken by 
MEMORAN'DUlvf IN SUl"PORl' OF MOTION 'TO 8 TroKS 
2 
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this Court, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification of 
Judge should be stricken because it was untimely filed. PlaintifPs Further Brief in Opposition to 
Motion for New Trial should be stricken beoause Plaintiff had already filed a responsive brief to 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
I. 'rIDS COURT SHOULD STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LIMITED DISQUALIFICATION BECAUSE IT 
WAS UNTIMELY FILED 
Plaintiff's brief filed on November 3~ 2010 does not comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Pro(~edure and should be stricken. According to the Idaho Civil Rules of Procedure, "any brief 
submitted in support of a motion shall be filed with the COurt and served so that it is received by 
the parties at least fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing. Any responsive brief s'hal! be filed 
with the court and served so that it is teceived by the parties at least seven (7) days prior to the 
hearing." LR.C.P, 7(b)(3)(E)(emphasis added). "The purpose of the tilDe reqUirements is to 
"provide sufficient D.Otice ... so that the opposing party may adequately prepare to present its 
position," Matter of Estate ofKeeven; 882 P,2d 457,463 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
In this case the hearing is set for November 4, 2010~ which mearul that Plaintiff had tmtil 
October 28 ~ 2010 to file a responsive brief to the Motil"tll for Limited Disqualification of Judge 
and be ill compliance with Idaho's rules. Plaintiff did not file a responsive hriefby the October 
28 deadline) which was his prerogative as there is no rule requiring Plaintiff to file a responSive 
brief. The rule does, however, require that should Plaintiff choose to tile a responsive brief it 
"shall be filed" at least seven days prior to the hearing. Here, Plaintiff attempts to circumvent 
the rule by filing a responsive brief to the Motion for Limited Disqualification on the day before 
3 
MeMORANOUM rN' SUPPORT o~ MOTION TO STRIKE 
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the hearing. 
Plaintiff's motives in filing such an obviously non-compliant brief are unclear. Plaintiff 
has missed the deadline and the opportunity to file a responsive brief to the Motion for Limited 
Disqualification of Judge. Plaintiff made no effort to contact Defendant to ask for more time to 
prepare and tl1e such a pleading. Instead, Plaintiff unabashedly filed the responsive brief on 
November 3,2010. the day before the hearing. Plaintiff even attempted to hide his responsive 
brie-fby piggy-backing it onto an Opposition to Motion for a New Trial. In doing so, Plaintiff 
has ignored the purpose of the time requirements and has not provided sufficient notice or left 
sufficient time for Defendants to adequately prepare to defend Plaintiffs arguments. 
II. TillS COURT SHOULD STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S FURTHER. BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS 
ALREADY FILED A RESPONSIVE BRIEF TO THAT MOTION 
Plaintiff's Further Brief in Opposition to Motion for New Trial should be stricken 
because Plaintiff has already flied a responsive brief to the Motion for New Trial. 'When 
briefing a motion, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow for a supporting brief~ an opposition 
brief. and a reply brief. LR,C.P.7(b)(3)(E). Defendant's Motion for New Trial was filed on 
October 1, 2010 along with a supporting brief. Plaintiff was given adequate time to respond to 
Defendant's motion, and filed a. responsive briefto the motion on October 13, 2010, Defendants 
filed a reply to Plaintiff's October 13 opposition on November 2,2010. Now, on November 3~ 
2010, after Defendant has already filed a reply, Plaintiff filed a "further brief" to raise arguments 
not raised in his initial opposition. Plaintiff should not be allowed to file additional briefing 
anytime he has new thought or arguments On thls issue. Defendant has responded to Plaintiff's 
4 
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10:29 AM & No, 80 l t, DO:~ 
opposition and the briefing is concluded. Plaintiff shonld not be allowed to disregard the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, therefore, this Court should strike Plaintiffs "further brjef." 
CONCLUSION 
Based on tile foregoing. Defendant respectfully requests that fuis Court strike Plaintiff's 
Bdef in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge/and Further 
Brief in Opposition to Motion for New Trial. 
DATED this Y day of November, 2010. 
MeMORANDUM IN SUl>PORiOf MOtION TO StRIKE 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
PETER STIRBA 
R. BLAXE HAMrL TON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5 
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QERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this yhy ofNove-mber, 2010 I caused to be served 
a true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR LIMn'ED DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE/AND FURTHER BRIEF 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL by the method indicated below, to the 
folloWing: 
Craig R. Jorgensen, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4 
P.O. Box 4904 
Pocatello, ID 83205·4904 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
151 North RJdge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brov,rn 
District Judge - Resident Chambers 
P.O. Box 775 
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTroN TO STRIKE 
tfJ. U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
vA U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
f) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
"f1 U.S. Mail, Postage Ptepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) OvernIght Mail 
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On November 4,2010, counsel for the above-named Plaintiff, Craig R. Jorgensen, counsel 
for the Defendant, Peter Stirba and Alan Johnston, appeared for further proceedings. Dorothy Snarr 
acted as court reporter for this proceeding. 
This matter was set for Defendant Rich County's Motion for Limited Disqualification of 
Judge. The Court advised that it was required under LR.C.P. Rule 40(d) to first address the issue 
involving the Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge. The parties provided argument. 
Following argument on the Motion for Limited Disqualification, the Court DENIED the 
Motion. The Court set forth the basis for its denial on the record. The Court set Defendant, Rich 
County's Motion for New Trial for hearing November 18,2010 at 1 :30 p.m. 
Defense counsel had previously requested a transcript of the status conference held 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 1 
"/,:11 
September 16, 2010, and has not received a copy. A transcript of the hearing, as well as an audio 
copy of the hearing, shall be forwarded to both parties. The Court further ordered that a transcript 
of the proceedings relative to Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification be completed and 
provided to counsel in advance of the hearing scheduled for November 18,2010. 
Defense counsel requested an evidentiary hearing be held regarding the issues involved in 
their motion for new trial which is currently scheduled for November 18, 2010. The Court heard 
comments and argument regarding the issue. The Court set forth on the record the parameters 
concerning what areas the parties would be allowed to inquire into and what areas the Court would 
prevent inquiry. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 4th day of November, 2010. 
Sixth District Judge 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the I c:{ R day of November, 2010, I mailed/served a true copy of 
the foregoing document on the attorney(s) I person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage 
thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered. 
ATTORNEY(S) IPERSON(S) 
Craig R. Jorgensen 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 4904 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904 
Peter Stirba 
Blake Hamilton 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Alan Johnston 
E.W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
P.O. Box 2949 
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RlCH COUNTY, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2002-0000072 
l\1El\10RANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR 
ALTERNATIVELY FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
Defendant Rich County, Utah, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Idaho R. 
Civ. Proc. 50 and 59, hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
1. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MOTION FOR NEW TltlAL OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING l'kffi Vll.RDICT. </ J. Lj 
NOV/O 41201 O/THU O~: 2~ PM STlRBA 6: ASSUC1PJIS FAX No, ~Ul 3b4 ~3JJ p, UUj 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND l 
1. From July 13) 2010 to July 26, 2010, a jury trial was held in this matter before 
Judge Mitchell W. Brown in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Bannock County located in 
Pocatello, Idaho, 
2. In addition to Rich County, the Plaintiff originally brought suit in this matter 
against Sheriff Dale Stacey ("Stacey"), Captain Gregg Athay ("Athay"), Deputy Chad Ludwig 
("Ludwig"), Sheriff Brent Bunn ("Bunn") and Bear Lake County. Idaho. 
3. On June 10, 1999, Stacey, Athay and Ludwig pursued Daryl Ervin ("Ervin"), the 
drunk driver who eventually collided with the Plaintiff's vehicle, during the Idaho portion of the 
pursuit at issue. Ludwig's vehicle was equipped with a dashboard camera on which Ludwig 
recorded a short video (the "dash cam video") of the final (approximately) ten miles of the 
pursuit. The dash cam video was entered as Defendant's Exhibit 209 at trial. 
4. The Idaho Supreme Court held that a reckless disregard standard, and not a 
negligence standard applies for police pursuits under I.e. § 49-623. Athay v. Stacey, 128 P.3d 
897 (Idaho 2005) ("Athay I"). 
5. In Athay 1, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the 
Plaintiff's claims against Ludwig on Summary Judgment because Ludwig's conduct relevant to 
this case did not amount to reckless disregard. 
1 On August 23.2010. Rich County orderod a transcript of the trial proceedings from the Bear Lake County Court 
Reporter and proVided a $2,500_00 deposit. As of November 4, 2010, Rich County has not received any portion of 
the transcript. The Court Repolter has estimated that a full transcript cannot be provided for at loast another eight 
weeks and thus the factual background set forth in this Momorandum is based Upon Rich County's legal counsel's 
trial notes and recollection of the proceedings. These facts will be supplemented when the trial transcript becomes 
available. 
2. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICH COUNTV'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR AL TERNA TIVEL Y FOR 
JUDGMBNT NOT\VITRSTANDrNG THE VERDICT. 
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6. In Athay IT, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the 
Plaintiffs claims against Athay on Summary Judgment because Athay's conduct relevant to this 
case did not amount to reckless disregard. Athay v, Stacey, 196 P.3d 325 (Idaho 2008) ("Athay 
II"). 
7. On July 8, 2010, Rich County filed its Proposed Supplemental Jury Instructions 
and Special Verdict Form that included two additional instructions. The second proposed 
supplemental instruction ("law of the case instruction") read as follows: 
"The law of this case is that the Idaho Supreme Court had determined that 
the actions of Bear Lake County Officers Greg [sic] Athay and Chad 
Ludwig during the pursuit of Mr. Daryl John Ervin, Jr. did not, as a matter 
of law, amount to teckless disregard." 
8. Athay and Ludwig testified at trial. During Athay's cross-examination, the 
Plaintiff objected to Rich County's question concerning Athay's involvement in the lawsuit. 
Following a conference outside the jury's presence, the Court ruled that Rich County could ask 
Athay if he was sued in this matter but could not inquire further as to the legal disposition of the 
case or the reasons for which the case's disposition came about. During Ludwig's direct 
examination~ the Court sustained the Plainti:frs similar objection and ruled that Rich County 
could only ask Llldwig ifhe was sued in this matter and ifhe was still a party, but could not 
inquire as to the case's legal disposition or how said disposition came about. 
9. In light of the Court's limitations on Athay's and Ludwig's testimony, Rich 
County requested that the Court instruct the jury, consistent with Rich County's proposed 
supplemental instruction, that the Idaho Supreme Court held that Athay and Ludwig were not 
liable to the Plaintiff as a matter of law because their conduct did not amount to reckless 
disregard. 
3. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICH COUNT'l'S MonON FOR NEW TRW. OR AL TERNATIVEL Y FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWlTHSTANDlNG THE VERDICT. 
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10. On July 22,2010, the Court held a jury instruction conference wherein it denied 
Rich County's proposed law of the case instruction on LR.E. 402 and 403 relevancy grounds. 
Rich County objected to the Court's failure to include the law of the case instruction because the 
holdings in Athay I and II are binding on this Court under the law of the case doctrine and the 
Idaho Supreme Court's determination that Athay's and Ludwig's conduct was not reckless 
disregard is directly relevant and helpful to the jury's consideration of Stacey's conduct. 
11. The Court also addressed Rich County's Proposed Special Verdict Form during 
the July 22,2010 jury instruction conference. The Proposed Special Verdict Form included 
Athay, Ludwig, and Bear Lake County among the non-parties to whom the jury could apportion 
fault for the Plaintiff's injuries. Rich County's Proposed Form included a question for each 
individual and/or entity to whom the jury may attribute fault 'asking the jury to first determine 
whether the party was negligent and whether the negligent conduct contributed to the Plainti:ff's 
injuries. The Court advised the parties that because Athay, Ludwig and Bear Lake County were 
not liable as a matter of law because their conduct did not amount to reckless disregard, the 
Court was unsure as to whether these non-parties should be included on the special verdict fonn. 
The Court took the issue under advisement. 
12. During the jury instruction conference, Rich County requested that Deby Eborn 
("Eborn"), the Bear Lake County Sheriff's Department dispatcher) also be included as a non-
party on the special verdict form. Rich County's request was based upon evidence presented at 
trial that Eborn knew of the deer-vehicle collison and decided not to inform the officers involved 
in the pursuit of the collision due to her belief that the pursuit would end before it reached the 
collision' s location. The Court also took this issue under advisement. 
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13. The following moming~ on July 23,2010, the Court provided the Parties a copy of 
the instructions it intended to give to the jury and the special verdict form. The special verdict 
fonn only included Stacey~ the Plaintiff and Ervin as parties to whom the jury could apportion 
fault. The Court did not explain the reason for omitting Eborn from the special verdict form. 
With respect to Bear Lake County, Ludwig, and Athay, the Court stated that because the Plaintiff 
could not make out a legal cause of action against these actors based on the holdings in Atbay I 
and II, these non-parties should not be included on the special verdict form. Rich County 
renewed its objections made during the jury instruction conference to the Court's decision 
arguing that the Court's ruling was contrary to the established law and interpretation of 
comparative fault in Idaho.2 
14. The Plaintiff testified at trial concerning, among other things, the damages he has 
suffered as a result of the accident for which he sought compensation at trial. Among the 
danlages the Plaintiff testified he has incurred is lost earning capacity due to the limitations in the 
types of employment he can perform in light of his paraplegia. 
15. On cross-examination> the Court prohibited Rich County from asking the Plaintiff 
about the reasons for which he lost his job as a substitute teaoher at Bear Lake High School. The 
Plaintiff previously testified in his deposition that he had inappropriate re1ationship(s) and/or had 
kissed some female high school students during the time he was employed as a substitute 
teacher. 
2 Rich County lodged several objections to the Court's rulings on julY instructions and the speoial verdict form. In 
the interest of accuracy, Rich County has not set forth all of objections and facts with speoificity pending its receipt 
of the relevant portions of the trial transcript. 
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16. On July 26, 2010, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff finding Rich 
County 30% liable for the Plaintiffs injures and awarding the Plaintiff $2,720,126.00 in 
economic damages and $1,000,000,00 in noneconomic damages. 
17. Following the trial, Rich County's counsel spoke to several jurors on the phone 
who were willing to discuss their impressions of the trial. Several jurors indicated that the jury 
questioned the reason for Bear Lake County's, the Bear Lake Officers' and Ebom's not being 
included on the special verdict form. One juror indicated that the jury generally felt that Bear 
Lake COUnty should have been apportioned some fault but given their choices, the percentage of 
fault that would have been apportioned to Bear Lake County was instead added to Rkh County's 
percentage. Further, another juror indicated that the jury assumed that because neither Athay nor 




On June 10, 1999, Ervin was being immediately pursued by Stacey, Athay and Ludwig as 
Ervin proceeded into and through Montpelier, Idaho and headed northward toward Bennington, 
Idaho. The Plaintiff originally filed suit against all three of these pursuing officers based on the 
theory that each officer's actions caused or contributed in some way to the accident and resulting 
injuries at issue. Despite the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court held that neither Athay's nor 
Ludwig's conduct rose to the level of reckless disregard, the Plaintiff did not attempt to 
distinguish Stacey's actions during the Idaho portion of the pursuit from the legally proper 
conduct of Athay or Ludwig. To the contrary, the Court permitted the Plaintiff's use of Athay's 
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and Ludwig's actions as a means of demonstrating that Stacey was in fact reckless and Rich 
County should be held liable for the Plaintiff's injuries, including cross-examination of both 
Athay and Ludwig as to the propriety of their conduct. 
On the other hand, Rich County was prohibited from arguing the converse inference from 
the collective conduct of the three pursuing officers. The Court excluded testimony and failed to 
instruct the jury that both Athay and Ludwig were not liable because neither officer acted in 
reckless disregard as a matter of law. Rich County was further ptevented from making the 
argument that because Athay's and Ludwig's conduct was proper in the pursuit context, that 
Stacey's conduct must likewise be appropriate unless the jury was convinced that there were 
sufficient facts to set Stacey's conduct apart from that of the other officers, that he could not be 
liable for the Plaintiff's injuries. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) "specifically permits the granting of a new trial 
based on insufficient evidence and errors in law occurring at trial.n Coombs v. Curnow, 219 P.3d 
453) 462 (Idaho 2009). A new trial is the appropriate remedy when evidence was erroneously 
admitted during the course of the trial or when a jury verdict is based upon incorrect instructions 
on the law or confusing or misleading special verdict form. See Id.; see also Le'Gall v. Lewis 
County, 923 P.2d 427, 431 (Idaho 1996) (citing Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
788 P.2d 1293, 1300-l301 (Idaho 1990); Walton v. Potlatch Corp., 781 P.2d 229 (Idaho 1991). 
A trial judge may also grant a new trial if s/he "determines that the verdict in not in accord with 
the clear weight of the evidence." Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Machinery Corp.~ 127 P.3d 147, 151 
(Idaho 2005) (quoting Karlson v. Harris, 97 P.3d 428,435 (Idaho 2004)). 
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When a court's errorCs) "affect[s] the substantial rights of the parties," such that a refusal 
to grant a new trial or set aside a verdict "appears .. , inconsistent with substantial justice," the 
aot or omission is not "harmless error" and a new trial should be granted. LR.C,P. 61. Here, the 
Court's e)tclusion of relevant testimony and evidence and failUre to correctly instruct the jury as 
to the applicable law seriously diminished Rich County's right to a fair trial wherein it could 
fully and accurately present its defense. Rich COUnty's Motion for New Trial should thus be 
granted. 
Where there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, a trial court may enter 
jUdgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") pursuant to LR.C.P. 50. See Coombs, 219 P.3d 
at 462; Bates v. Seldin, 203 P.3d 702, 704-705 (Idaho 2009). Unlike a motion for a new trial 
under LR.C.P. 59, on a motion for JNOV the court does not consider the admissibility or 
competency of the evidence, but instead considers all of the evidence submitted to the jury as it 
existed on the record, regardless of whether the evidence was properly admitted or e'Xcluded. See 
Coombs, 219 P.3d at 461-462. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to 
conclude that Stacey acted in reckless disregard for the safety of others thus giving rise to Rich 
County's liability for the accident that caused the Plaintiff's injuries. There was also inadequate 
evidence to support the jury's economic damage award of $2,720)26.00 and thus the Court 
should enter judgment for Rich County. 
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II. Grounds For Which It New Trial Should Be Granted. 
A. The Court Erroneously Failed to Include Bear Lake County and the Bear 
Lake County Officers on the Fault Apportionment Section of the Special 
Verdict Form. 
Idaho law provides that a court, at the request of any party, may direct the jury to find 
separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence or 
comparative responsibility attributable to each and every tortfeasor who either caused or 
contributed to the occurrence in question, whether or not they are parties to the case. VanBrunt 
v, Stoddard, 39 P .3d 621, 627 (Idaho 2001) (citing Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel W., Inc., 
621 P.2d 399, 403 (Idaho 1980)); I.C. § 6-802 (2010); see als{) Lassel1e v. Sllecial Products Co., 
677 P.2d 484, 485 (Idaho 1983). Where there is evidence that a non-party's conduct was causally 
connected to the Plaintiff's injuries, the non-party should be included among those to whom the 
jury may apportion a percentage of fault on the special verdict form. Van Brunt, 39 P.3d at 627-
628. True apportionment cannot be achieved until all actors who caused or contributed to the 
incident at issue are included. Id.; see als{) Pocatello Indus, Park Co., 621 P.2d at 403. 
Over Rich Countyls objections, the Court declined to include Bear Lake County, the Bear 
Lake County Officers, and Deby Ebom on the Special Verdict Form because Bear Lake County 
and the Bear Lake County officers actors could not be held liable to the Plaintiff as a matter of 
law because the officers did not act with reckless disregard and were properly dismissed from the 
S The Court also declined to include Doby Eborn on the special verdict form despite the fact that she has never been 
a party in this matter and her conduct has never been subject to judicial scrutiny. Further, as a police dispatcher, 
Eborn would not be subject to the reokless disregard standard of conduct in I.e. §9-623 and should have been 
included on tho special verdiot form Upon a showing of causal negligence. 
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The Court's analysis is flawed as it contradicts the purpose and meaning ofI.C. § 6-801 
as interpreted by Idaho courts. There is no dispute that fault may be apportioned to non-parties in 
a special verdict form including individuals against whom claims were previously dismissed. See 
Vannoy v. UnirQyal Tire Co., 726 P.2d 648,650 (Idaho 1985). (quoting Lasselle, 677 P.2d at 485 
("It is established without doubt that, when apportioning negligence, a jury must have the 
opportunity to consider the negligence of all parties to the transaction, whether or not they be 
parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to the other 
tortfeasors either by operation of law or because of a prior release. "). Unknown parties may also 
be included on special verdict forms. See Jensen v. Shank, 585 P.2d 1276 (Idaho 1978). 
Undeniably, it is logically impossible for non-parties and individuals whose identity is unknO\Vl1 
to be held legally liable for a plaintiff's injuries and thus the Court's basis for removing Ludwig, 
Athay, and Bear Lake County from the special verdict form was incorrect. 
In order to determine whether to include a given party on a special verdict form. "the 
question is not whether a judgment would or could be rendered against that person, but whether 
or not his conduct ... caused or contributed to the accident and injuries.» Vannoy, 726 P.2d at 
655-656. The Idaho Supreme Court has highlighted the distinction between legal "liability" and 
"responsibility" or "causation" that is considered on a special verdict form: 
"It is not necessary to establish that all persons included on the verdict form 
would be liable for some or all of the damages attributable to their conduct or 
their product. Indeed, in many instances, it will not be possible to establish 
liability for various reasons including immunity, settlement, failure to join as a 
party, unknown identity, statute of limitations, or numerous other possible 
causes." 
Id. at 655, It is for the jury to determine whether an actor's a actor's conduct was causally 
connected to the plaintiff>s injuries and only "in the rare situation in which reasonable minds 
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could not reach different conclusions [may] the trial court [be] justified in removing the issue 
from the consideration of the jury." Id. (quoting Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 692 P.2d 345 
(Idaho 1984) (pineite omitted). 
There was substantial evidence introduced at trial that the actions of Athay> Ludwig and 
Ebom causally contributed to the accident and the Plaintiff's injuries and thus the factual issue of 
apportionment should have been left to the jury. The Court's reasoning that because Athay's and 
Ludwig's conduct did not amount to reckless disregard exempted them from apportionment is 
incorrect because the reckless disregard standard is merely a legal level of liability at which the 
protections of the Idaho Tort Claims Act ceases to immunize police officers for their conduct 
within the scope of their employment. The Supreme CourCs holding that Ludwig and Athay did 
not act with reckless disregard did not include a determination that these officers were not 
negligent and/or that their conduct in nO way contributed or proximately caused the Plaintiff's 
mjUfles. 
The Court's removal of Bear Lake County, Ludwig and Athay from the special verdict 
form was euoneous and based on incorrect and exceptional interpretation of the vast body of 
Idaho case law on this issue. Further, the Court's decision not to include Eborn on the special 
verdict form, particularly absent any reasOn for doing so, was similarly in error and the Court 
should grant a new trial. 
B. The Court Failed to Instruct the Jury on the Relevant Law of the Case. 
When, in deciding a case on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court "states in its opinion a 
principle or rule oflaw necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the 
case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon 
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subsequent appeaL. .. ~' Swanson v. Swanson, 5 P.3d 973,976 (Idaho 2000) (citing Suitts v. First 
Sec. Bank ofIdaho, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Idaho 1985)). Trial courts must ensure a remanded 
case is tried "in light of and in consonance with" the law as set forth by the appellate court in that 
particular case. 5 P.3d at 976 (citing Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash., 
74 P.2d 702, 703 (Idaho 1937)). The law of the case doctrine "protects against relitigation of 
settled issues and assures obedience of inferior courts to decisions of superior courts." 5 P ,3d at 
977 (quoting NAACP, Detroit Branch v. Police Officers Ass'u, 676 F.Supp. 790, 791 (E.D. 
Mich. 1988) (emphasis in original). 
In Afuay I, the flIst issue addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court was that the appropriate 
standard of liability for police pursuits under I.e. § 49-623 was "reckless disregard" as opposed 
to negligence. 128 P.3d at 902. Clearly, the Court's decision on the standard of conduct by which 
the Defendants) conduct should be judged is "precedent to be followed in successive stages of 
[the J same litigation." and in fact has been followed since the Athay I opinion was issued. 
Swanson,5 P.3d at 977. While the Court noted that it had previously defmed reckless disregard 
in the context of Idaho's guest statute, Athay I was the fIrst case in which the reckless disregard 
standard was applied to polioe pursuits and thus the first time any court considered what police 
officer conduct would amount to reckless disregard and tort liability. 128 P.3d at 902. 
To determine whether Ludwig's acted with reckless disregard, the Court evaluated 
Ludwig's actions On June 10, 1999, including; 1) Ludwig's unsuccessful attempt to stop the 
fleeing vehicle wi.th spike strips despite not having a description of the fleeing vehicle or seeing 
the vehicle's license plate number; 2) Ludwig's joining in the pursuit behind Athay and Stacey 
and remaining involved for roughly eight miles; and 3) Ludwig's involvement in the pursuit 
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through Montpelier, including "fanning out," for greater visibility. 128 P.3d at 907. The Court 
concluded that '''there is absolutely nothing in the record showing that Deputy Ludwig operated 
his vehicle with reckless disregard for the safety of others or that his conduct induced Ervin to 
continue fleeing at a high rate of speed.» Id. This conclusion, like that pronouncing the 
applicable standard of conduct, became the law of the case. The Plaintiff could not, and did not, 
pursue his legal claims against Ludwig following the Court's decision because the Court made a 
binding determination that as a matter of law, Ludwig's actions did not render him liable for the 
Plaintiff' oS injuries. 
Similarly in Athay II, the Court considered Athay's liability for his actions relevant to 
this matter, including: 1) Athay's dispatching Ludvvig to attempt to stop the fleeing vehicle with 
spike strips; 2) Athay's joining in pursuit behind Stacey and remaining involved until the 
pursuit's tennination; 3) Athay's calling ahead to request police traffic control assistance as the 
pursuit passed through Montpelier; 4) Athay's denial of Ludwig's request to attempt to catch up 
to the fleeing vehicle based on his belief the vehicle would slow down and/or stop; 5) Athay's 
observing the vehicle fishtail and telling the other officers to back off; and 6) Athay'g calling 
ahead to Caribou County to request that another officer attempt to stop the vehicle with spike 
strips. 196 P.3d at 333-334. The Court concluded "Deputy Athay did not engage in conduct that 
met the standard of reckless disregard." rd. at 334. 
At trial, the Plaintiff elicited testimony from both Athay and LudWig that suggested their 
actions were not taken with public safety and prudence in mind, thus implying that Atbay's and 
Ludwig's conduct was with reckless disregard.4 In light of the Idaho Supreme Court's prior 
4 Notably, the Plaintiff extensively cross-examined Ludwig regarding his use of spike strips to attempt to stop the 
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detertninations that Ludwig's and Athay's conduct listed above did not amount to reckless 
disregard, Rich County fully ex-pected it would be able to refute the Plaintiff's suggestions by 
introducing testimony that the claims against Ludwig and Athay were dismissed and that the 
Court would instruct the jury tl::tat Ludwig's and Athay' s conduct was not reckless disregard as a 
matter oflaw. The Court denied Rich County the ability to clarity the Plaintiff's 
mischaracterization of Ludwig's and Athay's conduct and simultaneously allowed the Plaintiff to 
capitalize on an incorrect statement of the law of the case, thereby greatly impinging upon the 
trial's fairness as to Rich County. 
When a trial court's instructions to the jury misstate the applicable law and mislead the 
jury or prejudice a party, a new trial should be granted. Lawton v. CiJ;y of Pocatello, 886 P.2d 
330,338 (Idaho 1994) (citing Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hasp., Inc., 830 P.2d 1185 (Idaho 
1992). The trial court~s failure to instruct the jury that Athay's and Ludwig'S conduct was not 
reckless disregard as a matter of law, particularly after allowing Athay's and Lud'Wig's testimony 
that they had been sued but were no longer parties in this case, mislead the jury by inviting the 
legally incorrect aSSUmption that all Or part of Athay's and Lud'Wig's actions were with reckless 
disregard and that Stacey's conduct was likewise reckless. 5 
Further, fue Court based its decision not to instruct the jury on the law of the case because 
such instruction was irrelevant to a determination of Stacey's conduct. The law of the case as to 
fleeing vehicle. The Plaintiff inquired as to the extent of Ludwig's training and experience using spike strips, the 
conditions surrounding his deployment of spike strips in this case and questioned whether Ludwig had actually used 
the spike strips correctly since only one of Ervin's tires was deflated. Rich County will supplement this factual 
reoitation when the relevant portions of'the trial transcript becomo available. 
5 Rich County represents that based on its conversations with several jurors after the trial's conclUsion, the jury was 
actually mislead to believe that Athay and Ludwig had lost their jobs with the Bear Lake County Sheriffs 
Department based on their involvement and conduct in this matter and/or that Bear Lake County admitted some 
responsibility for the Plaintiffs injuries and had reached a settlement.so that they were no longer parties to this casco 
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Athay's and Ludwig's conduct is clearly helpful to the jury's consideration of Stacey's conduct 
and is highly probative of whether Stacey, who except for initiating the pursuit in Utah, behaved 
nearly identically to Ludwig and Athay who were deemed not reckless, acted with reckless 
disregard thereby subjecting Rich County to liability for the Plaintiff's injuries. 
As explained above, Athay I was the fITs! time the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed police 
officer conduct in a high-speed pursuit under the reckless disregard standard. In reaching its 
decision that Ludwig and Athay were not reckless, the Supreme Court compared Athay's and 
Ludwig's actions to those taken by Stacey and essentially set forth a benchmark of conduct that 
falls short of reaching reckless disregard. Here, the jury should have been afforded the same 
opportunity to view Stacey's actions with the benefit of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision so 
that, consistent with the Athay I and II Court's instructions for remand, it could determine 
whether Stacey's conduct was somehow different andlor more inappropriate than that of Athay 
and Ludwig. 
The Court's failure to instruct on the law of the case was incredibly prejudicial to Rich 
County because it misstated the relevant and binding law that has clear implications on the juryls 
consideration of Stacey's conduct. The Athay I and Athay II Courts' determination that neither 
Athay nor Ludwig acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others cannot be fairly 
characterized as prejudicial to the Plaintiff because it is simply the law of this case and is highly 
probative of whether Stacey's conduct amounted to reckless disregard. The Court's decision is 
therefore erroneous and a new trial should be granted. 
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C. Rich County Was Pre-vented From Full Cross E1.::.Ilntination of the Plaintiff as 
to IDs Employment Opportunities and Thus the Economic Damages He 
Suffered. 
Among the damages the Plaintiff claimed he suffered due to the injuries he sustained 
from the accident at issue was a significant reduction in his earning capacity. The Plaintiff 
testified at trial concerning the limitations his paraplegia placed on the types of jobs he could 
perform in the Bear Lake County area. 
To refute the Plaintiff' 8 testimony that it was only his injuries that limited his ability to 
obtain gainful employment, Rich County attempted to cross-examine the Plaintiff about some of 
the reasons the Plaintiff may have lost his job with the Bear Lake School District, among other 
jobs. The Court sustained the Plaintiff's objections to Rich County's questions concerning the 
Plaintiff s admitted inappropriate relationships with one or more female Bear Lake High School 
students where and while he was employed as a substitute teacher. This evidence should have 
been admitted because it is relevant to the damages the Plaintiff claims he owed. If there were 
other factors of the Plaintiff's own choosing that have negatively impacted 'the Plaintiff's earning 
capacity, that evidence is directly relevant to the jury's determination of an appropriate damages 
award. The Courf s exclusion of this evidence affected Rich County's substantial right to fully 
present its defense and cross-examine adverse witnesses and thus a new trial should be granted. 
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Verdict or Grant a New Trial. 
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A. There Was Insufficient Evidence P..-esented at Trial to Find Rich Connty 
Liable for the Plaintiff's Injuries. 
In Athay I) the Idaho Supreme Court determined that Idaho Code § 49-623 creates a 
reckless disregard standard applicable to police pursuits such as the one at issue. 128 P.3d at 902. 
Idaho Code § 49-623 provides: 
(1) The driver of an authorized emergency or police vehicle, when 
responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or 
suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not upon returning 
from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but 
subj ect to the conditions stated. 
(2) The driver of an authorized emergency or police vehicle may: 
(a) Park or stand, irrespective of the parldng or standing provisions ofthls 
title; 
(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slOWing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life 
or property; 
(d) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in 
specified directions 
(4) The foregoing provision shall not relieve the driver of an authorized 
emergency or police vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the 
safety of all persons, nor shall these provisions protect the driver from the 
consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others. 
I.C. § 49-623. 
The Athay I Court defined reckless disregard as, "the type of conduct engaged in by the 
driver when he actually perceives the danger and continues his COUrse of conduct." 128 P.3d at 
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902. The Idaho Supreme Court elaborated on this definition of reckless disregard in Athay II, 
stating: 
"To constitute reckless disregard, the actor's conduct must not only create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm but, as we held in Athay J, the actor must actually 
perceive the high degree of probability that harm will result and continue in his course of 
conduct. Actual knowledge of the high degree of probability that harm will result does 
not require knowledge of the actual person or persons at risk, or the exact manner in 
which they would be harmed. It only requires knowledge of the high degree of 
probability of the kind of harm that the injured party suffered." 
196 P.3d at 332, See also Harris v. State, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Idaho, 1992). 
Based on the Idaho Supreme Court's prior holdings in this matter, the Plaintiff, in order 
to hold Sheriff Stacey liable for any of Plaintiff's injuries or other damages, needed to show that 
Sheriff Stacey had actual knowledge of the high probability that another motorist could be hit 
and seriously injured by the fleeing motorist and despite that knowledge, continued his course of 
conduct. The Plaintiff also needed to show that Sheriff Stacey's conduct in pursuing Daryl 
Ervin's vehicle created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm. The Plaintiff/ailed to do so and 
thus did not present sufficient evidence to hold llich County liable for the Plaintiff s injuries. 
As stated, supra, the Athay I Court, in an attempt to determine whether Ludwig acted 
with reckless disregard, evaluated Ludwig'S actions on June 10,1999, including: 1) Ludwig's 
unsuccessful attempt to stop the fleeing vehicle with spike strips despite not having a description 
of the fleeing vehicle or seeing the vehicle's license plate nuu1ber; 2) Ludwig's joining in the 
pursuit behind Athay and Stacey and remaining involved for roughly eight miles; and 3) 
Ludwig's involvement in the pursuit through Montpelier, including "fanning out," for greater 
visibility. 128 P.3d at 907. The Court concluded that "there is absolutely nothing in the record 
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shoVJing that Deputy LudVJig operated his vehicle 'with reckless disregard for the safety of others 
or that his conduct induced Ervin to continue fleeing at a high rate of speed." Id. 
Similarly in Athay II, the Court considered Athay's liability for his actions relevant to 
this matter, including: 1) Athay's dispatching Ludwig to attempt to stop the fleeing vehicle with 
spike strips; 2) Athay's joining in pursuit behind Stacey and remaining involved until the 
pursuit's termination; 3) Athay's calling ahead to request police traffic control assistance as the 
pursuit passed through Montpelier; 4) Athay's denial of Ludwig's request to attempt to catch up 
to the fleeing vehicle based on his belief the vehicle would slow down and/or stop~ 5) Athay's 
observing the vehicle fishtail and telling the other officers to back off; and 6) Athay's calling 
ahead to Caribou County to request that another officer attempt to stop the vehicle with spike 
strips. 196 P.3d at 333-334. The Court concluded "Deputy Athay did not engage in conduct that 
met the standard of reckless disregard." Id. at 334, 
Therefore at trial. the Plaintiff needed to establish that Sheriff Stacey's conduct differed 
from Ludwig's and Athay's to the extent that it would rise to the level of reckless disregard, The 
only difference the Plaintiff was able to show Was that Sheriff Stacey initiated the pursuit in Utah 
and continued to follow the fleeing vehicle into Wyoming and into Idaho. However, in finding 
that Ludwig and Athay' oS conduct did not amount to reckless disregard, the Idaho Supreme Court 
already determined that the pursuit was justified and thus initiating it could not amount to 
reckless disregard, Therefore, at trial the Plaintiff failed to establish that Sheriff Stacey acted 
with reckless disregard, 
19, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MOTION POR NEW TRIAL OR ALTERNATlVEL Y FOR 
JUDGMBNT NOTWlTBSTANDlNG THll VEllbICi, 
NOV /04/201 O/THU 05: 33 ST & ASSOC I P.TES No,801 364 8355 p, 021 
B. There is Insufficient Evidence in the Record to Support the Jury's Economic 
Damage Award Against Rich County. 
The jury awarded Plaintiff $2,720,126.00 in economic damages. However, even taking 
the Plaintiff's: projections of economic loss, projection of the present value of Plaintiffs life care 
plan, and the plaintiff's medical bills, it is unclear how the Jury awarded $2,720,126,00 in 
economic damages. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs projections of economic loss and the present 
value of Plaintiff s life care plan are not supported by the evidence introduced at trial. 
For example, at trial Plaintiff's economic expert specifically testified that these numbers 
were merely theoretical and presented the worst case scenario for the Plaintiff. Specifically. 
regarding the projected economic loss, the Plaintiff testified that he was making more than he 
had prior to the accident, he had no desire to move, and that he had no desire to gain any further 
education. Despite these facts the Plaintiff's economic expert projected the Plaintiff's economic 
loss at $842,259.00 or $762,054.00. Also, regarding the prOjected present value of life care plan 
the Plaintiff testified that he had not had daily assistance nor would he use daily assistance, 
would not use or require psychological services, and again he had no desire to gain any further 
education. Despite this evidence the Plaintiff s economic expert included these items in his 
projection of the present value oflife care plan. Simply put the evidence in the record does not 
support the Jury's economic damage award against Rich County. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant Rich 
County's Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
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DATED this Lj day of November, 2010. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: ~ -1l~ 
PETER STIRBA 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFIC TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of November, 2010 I caused to be served 
a true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICH 
COUNTY'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR ALTERNATIVELY FORJUDGl\1ENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Craig R. Jorgensen, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4 
P.O. Box 4904 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904 
Alan Johnston 
PIKE HERNDON STOSICH & JOHNSTON 
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Honorable Mitchell W. Bro'Wll 
District Judge - Resident Chambers 
P.O. Box 775 
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
C·",)"Facs'imile 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~)"F;csimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
( ) Ove.nnght Mail 
v~simile 
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ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No, 7709) 
PIKE HERNDON STOSICH & JOHNSTON 
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Telephone: (208) 528-6444 
Telefax: (208) 528-6447 
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118) 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah BarNo. 11395) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Telefax: (801) 364-8355 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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RICH COUNTY, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
The State of Idaho to: 
( 
Kyle D. Athay 
c/o Craig Jorgensen, Esq. 
920 East Clark 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4094 
SUBPOENA 
[Kyle Athay] 
Case No. CV-02-00072 
Judge Mitchell W. Brown 
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YOU ARE CO:M1v1ANDED: 
[X] to appear in the Court at the place, date and time specified below to testify in the 
above case, 
[] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a 
deposition in the above case. 
[X] to produce or permit inspection and copying of the following documents or 
objects, including electronically stored information~ at the place. date and time specified 
below. 
1. Any and all documents indicating your wireless phone service number and 
wireless carrier/provider company name. 
2. Any and all records pertaining to the wireless phone service nurnber(s) in 
your name or used by you, which are dated or were prepared between July 
1,2010 and October 1,2010, including, but not limited to: 
a. Billing statements and records, prepared or retained by your wireless 
service provider or kept electronically or otherwise by you including 
incoming and/or outgoing call detail records, sent and/or received 
text message records, andior text and/or picture message records. 
b. Any other documents pertaining in any way to sent and/or received 
text messages, including,. but not limited to, records of text message 
content, records of the identity and/or phone number to which you 
sent text messages or from which you received text messages, 
records of picture message data including any photos sent to or 
received by you, and any other phone call, data or other records. 
[] to permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time specified 
below. 
!'AA J~O, DUl JDLt bj:Jj 




Sixth District Court 
Bear Lake County Courthouse 
7 East Center 




You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified 
above, Or to produce or pennit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be 
held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of 
$100.00 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
DATED this _-=-_day of November. 2010, 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
PETER STIRBA 
R BLAKE HAMILTON 
Attorneys For Defendant 
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ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709) 
PIKE HERNDON STOSIeR & JOHNSTON 
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Telephone: (208) 528-6444 
Telefax: (208) 528-6447 
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118) 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street~ Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Telefax: (801) 364-8355 
A ttomeys for Defendmtt 
rW,TR\CT COURT 
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1lEf'UTY_---CUENO. 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
KYLEATHAY, 
v. 
RICH COUNTY, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
The State of Idaho to: 
{fj 1M) 
Kyle D. Athay 
clo Craig Jorgensen, Esq. 
920 East Clark 
Pocatello. ID 83205-4094 
SUBPOENA 
[Brandy Peck) 
Case No. CV-02-00072 
Judge :Mitchell W. Brown 
NOV/D5/2010/FRI 05: 13 STIRBA & ASSOCIATES FAX No. 80 1 364 8355 P. 008 
yOU ARE CO:rvfMANDED: 
[X] to appear in the Court at the place, date and time specified below to testify in the 
above case. 
[] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a 
deposition in the above case. 
[X] to produce or pennit inspection and copying of the following documents or 
objects, including electronically stored information, at the place, date and time specified 
below. 
1. Any and all records pertaining to the wireless phone service for phone 
number (208) 240-4162, or any other wireless phone number in your name 
or used by you, which are dated or were prepared bemreen July 1, 2010 and 
October 1,2010, including. but not limited to: 
a. Billing statements and records, prepared or retained by your wireless 
service provider or kept electronically or otherwise by you including 
incoming andlor outgoing call detail records, sent andlor received 
text message records) andlor text andlor picture message records. 
b. Any other documents pertaining in any way to sent andlor received 
text messages, including, but not limited to, records of text message 
content, records of the identity andlor phone number to which you 
sent text messages or from which you received text messages, 
records of picture message data including any photos sent to or 
received by you, and any other phone call, data or other records. 
[] to permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time specified 
below. 
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Sixth Disrrict Court 
Bear Lake County Courthouse 
7 East Center 




You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified 
above, or to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be 
held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of 
$100.00 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
[; 
DATED this ___ day of November, 2010. 





R BLAKE HAMIL TON 
Attorneys For Defendant 
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ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709) 
PIKE HERNDON STOSrCH & JOHNSTON 
151 NorthRidge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Fails, ID 83403-2949 
Telephone: (208) 528-6444 
Telefax: (208) 528-6447 
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118) 
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON (Utah Bar No. 11395) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, DT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Telefax: (&01) 364-8355 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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RlCH COUNTY, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
The State of Idaho to: 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
[T-Mobile] 
Case No. CV-02-00072 
Judge Mitchell W. Brown 
Corporation Service Company 
T-Mobile Registered Agent (Idaho) 
1401 Shoreline Drive 
Suite 2 
Boise, ID 83702 
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YOU ARE COMMANDED: 
[J to appear in the Court at the place, date and time specified below to testifY in the 
above case. 
[] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a 
deposition in the above case. 
[X] to produce or copy the following documents, including electronically stored 
infonnation in your possession, custody, or control and mail or deliver to R. Blake 
Hamilton at the law offices of Stirba & Associates at the place, date and time specified 
below. 
1. Any and all cellular phone records, which are dated or were prepared 
between July 1, 2010 and October 1,2010, retained for T-Mobile cellular 
customer Brandalynn (Brandy) Mann Peck, Wireless Number (208) 240-
4162, including, but not limited to: 
a. Billing records. 
b. Call detail records. 
c. Text detail and content records. 
d. Photos or other phone data stored online or electronically. 
e. Subscriber information. 
[] to permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time specified 
below. 
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PLACE, DATE AND TIME: 
Place: Stirba & Associates 
215 South State Street 
Suite 750 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Date: November 12,2010 
Time: 5 :00 p.m. 
p, 012 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified 
above. or to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be 
held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of 
$100.00 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
DATED this S day of November, 2010. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
PETER STIRBA 
R BLAKE HAMILTON 
Attorneys For Defendant 
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Facsimile: (208) 237-1706 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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) PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF IN 
) .' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR A 
) . NEW TRIAL 
) 
COMES NO,,\V the Plaintiff, and provides the following points,. authorities, and 
arguments:in opposition to the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and alternative Motion to 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
Summary ofPlamtiff's Position 
1. TIlls Court is given wide discretion to deny Defendant's Motion for a.New Trial and 
won't be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
2. There is no .proof the Bear Lake County officers breached any duty of either the 
reckless disregard standard or a negligence standard. 
3. Defendant~s proof at trial was that all officers, including the Bear Lake County 
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officers, acted carefully and without negligence. 
4. The Bear Lake County officers have been fully adjudicated as not having committed 
reckless disregard. There is no proof they acted with negligence. 
5. Defendant's attempt to equate itself with the absolved Bear Lake County officers is, 
.' and ~as, an inappropriate attempt to coattail itself into a more favorable light to the jury. 
6. Defendant cannot complaip. about, it's lack of cross-examination opportunities of the 
Plaintiff. If Defendant seriously wanted to show negative impacts on Plaintiff's employability it 
could and should have called employers rallier than make an underhanded attempt at character 
assassination. Proof'offered through this kind of cross examination had limited probative value 
which was far outweighed by it's prejudicial effects. The Court was proper in limiting such 
iilappropriate examination. 
7. The proof offered at trial was more than sufficient to show Rich County's continuing 
and complete breach of it's duty. Sheri:ff Stacy made numerous choices to continue·his 
dangerous pursuit all the while knowing that the pursuit and the dangers connected therewith . 
created a high probability of d;mger. 
8. There was sufficient evidence to support the jUry's award of economic damage against 
,Rich County. Plaintiff's proof of these economic damages was supported by expert testimony, 
logic, and credibility. The economic damage proof offered by the Defendant was not credible. 
The jury was proper in finding the award of economic damages it did. 
9. The Defendant has not met it's burden by showing sufficient grounds for a new trial. 
Defendant has failed to provide timely statement of it's grounds for a new trial in violation of the 
provisions ofIRCP 59(a) and 59(b). 
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10. Assuming, arguendo, that there were~ors in the proceedings, such errors are 
harmless. Granting a new trial, or a judgment notwithstanding the ve:rdict would be inconsistent 
with substantial justice. Nothing that occurred in the trial affected the substantial rights of the 
Defendant. 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a trial judge's grant of a new trial on appeal, appellate courts apply the 
abuse of discretion standard. Karlson v_ Harris 140 Idaho 561~ 97 P.3d 428 (2004). A trial 
judge has wide discretion to grant or deny a request for a new trial and will not be overturned on 
appeal absent a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Appellate Court will primarily focus 
upon the process used by the trial court :in reaching his decision, not upon the result of that 
decision. The triaJ,judge is in a far better positio~ than the Appellate Court to weigh the 
demeanor, credlbility, and testimony of witnesses and the pentuasiveness of all the evidence., 
The inquiry on appeal is going to be: 
form. 
(1) Whether the trial Judge correctly perceived the issue of one of discretion; 
(2) Whether the trial judge acted within the outer boundaries of his disc,retion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific available choices and; 
. (3) "Whether the trial judge reached his decision by exercise of reason. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
It was not necessary to include Bear Lake County officers on the special verdict 
(A) Idaho statutory comparative negligence scheme. 
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( 
Defendant asserts that the Court should :have included Bear Lake County officers on the 
special verdict fonn. Defendant asserts :furfuer that inclusion was needed for apportionment of 
fault. (See Defendant's Memorandurri. page 9-15). 
The Court was correct in not including these non parties on the special verdict form. 
Defendanfs arguments fails to recognize Idaho statutory scheme relating to comparative 
negligence. Further DefenclanC'S arguments are inconsistent with proof offer~d at trial. See 
specifically Idaho Code Section 6-801; 6~802; and 6·803 .. 
, 
Idaho's legislature adopted the "individual rule" when it enacted comp arative negligence. 
Beitzel v. Orton, 120 IdallO 709) 713,827 P.2d 1160 (1992). The negligence of the Plaintiffmust . . 
be compared against each individual Defendant in determining whether Plaintiff can recover. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has analyzed the statutory scheme on numerous occasions. 
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Van Bruntv. Stoddard, 126 Idaho 681, 687, 39 P,3d 
. . . 
621, 627 (2001) and there dec~ed. to include a non party on a special verdict fonn, The Court 
noted the assertion that a passenger should be listed on the special verdict and said: 
"Testimony by Hopkins that he felt partially responsible for the accident did not, in 
and ofitself, make him contributorily negligent. We conclude that:, having found 
no breach of duty by Hopkins and no causal connection between iris actions and 
the resultant inJpries to Van; Brunt:, the District Court properly excluded Hopkins 
from the special verdict fonn. 39 P.3d at 688. (Emphasis added) 
In 2009 the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11,205 P3.d 660 
(2009), The Supreme Court noted, after discussing Van Brunt; 
Nevertheless, before a non party is included on a special verdict faun, 
"there must be a showing'mat the requisite elements of a cause of action 
against them have been presented at trial [citation omitted],' The court in 
Van Brunt found that the District Court had properly excluded a non party 
from the special verdict fonn because no causal connection between his 
actions and the :injury of the Plaintiffwere shown. 136 Idaho App. 687-88, 
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39 P.3d 627-28. In contras~ inLe 'Gall v. Lewis County) 192 Idaho 182, 
923 P.2d 427 (1996), this Court found that a non party actor should have 
been included on the special verdict fonn after evidence was presented th.at 
the actor had a duty, had breached that duty. and there was a causal 
connection between the breech and the injury. 129 Idaho 185, 923 P .2d 
430. the Court found that, based on that evidence, a jury could have 
concluded the actor had negligently contributed to the injUry. id. 
Therefore, to include a non party on'a special verdict form the elements of a 
cause of action must have been presented at !rial. (Emphasis added) 147 
Idaho at 18 
(8) There is no proof the Bear Lake officers committed any breach of duty. 
In the case at hand, Defendant Rich Coonty has presented no evidence that Bear Lake 
County officers were guilty of either reckless disregard or negligence. On the contrary, 
Defendant's whole approach to the case was to show'that all of the officers were careful. 
The Bear Lake County officers, in a police pursuit context and pursuant to statute, owed 
only a duty to Kyle Athay to not act with reckless disr~gard. It has been fully and completely 
. adjudicated that such duty has not been. breached. Since there is no cause of action which could, 
be made out against the Lake County deputies, fuey need not be included on the speciaJ. 
verdict fonn. It has been fully and completely adjudicated, on the merits, that the duty they owed, 
(not to commit tecldess disregard) has not been breached. Therefore, pursuant to the holding ill 
Jones v. Crawford, the Court did not need to include non party Bear Lake County officers on the 
special verdict fonn. 
The Bear Lake County officers did not owe a duty of due care to the Plaintiff. Defendant 
",rill argue that the Bear Lake County officers were negligent and that thus negligenoe is a reason 
they should be included on the special verdict form. However, the officers. did not owe a duty of 
reasonable care, the negligence standard, to Kyle Athay. By statute, they were free to be negligent 
toward Kyle Athay. If there is no duty there can be no breach and there is no cause of action. 
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Defendant offers no proof and no argrunent that the Bear Lake County officers were 
negligent. On the contrary, it went to great lengths to present a case that all the officers were 
careful. The events and holding in Jones v. Crawforth is instructive. Jones v. Crawforth was a 
m.edical malpractice case. Mrs. Jones Qied when a pressure cuffwas used to speed up reinfusion 
of her blood during surgery. Air was introduced into her blood stream which created a deadly 
embolism. 
The transfuSO! (B and B Auto Transfusion Services) sought to Q.ave the hospital (H:TV) 
and the employer oftlle anesthesiologist involved (AerV) included on the special verdict form. 
The District Court declined an~ the Supreme Court affir:roed, The rationale for declining to 
include these alleged actors on the special verdict fonn was that B and B had failed to prove that 
HTV and ACTV had vio~ated the standard of care owed by a health care provider .. 
Here, Defendant Rich County could not and did not prove mat the Bear Lake County 
officers acted out~ide of the requisite standard of care. The duty these officers owed was to not 
commit reckless disregard. It has been :fully and completely adjudicated that they did not act with 
reckless disregard. TIus was a clear determination oftlle Idaho Supreme Court and was the law of 
the case. The dutY to act without negligence did not apply in tbis case. Even assuming,' arguendo, 
that it did, there is no proof that the Bear Lake County officers acted With negligence. Once again~ 
Rich County's presentation at trial was that all the officers were careful. 
It is illogical and inconsistent,with the purposes of Summary Judgment to apportion fault 
in this case where the Supreme Court has ruled there was no fault. When this matter was argued 
attrial, Plaintiff cited Bowie v. 'youn~ 813 So.2d 562,568-570 (LA App. 3· Circuit 2002). 
Although the article [ statute] is silent regarding dismissed, non-negligent 
Defenda~ts, we believe that it is illogical to consider these parties in t~e allocation 
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of fault when it has previously been determined that they did not cause or contribute 
to the injury as required by the article. Further, such a reading of the article would 
result in the possibility of penalizing the Plruntiffby forcing the allocation. of fault 
to non-negligent previously dismissed parties thereby reducing her recovery. Such 
an application of the law \,\rould be absurd. 
Likewise, in this case it is absurd to include the Bear Lake County officers on the special 
verdict form. They have been adjudicated as not having committed reckless disregard. There is no 
) 
proof they acted with negligence. Defendant's own proof at trial Was to show the officers acted 
carefully. It is inconsistent and absurd for Defendant to define the case argumg the officers were 
careful and in the same breath claim they were negligent. 
Defendant.at trial, and still in it's present motion, attempted to equate it's conduct with that 
ofDep~ties Ludwig and Afuay. In effect, Defendant wanted to, and still wants to, coattail itself 
into a defense verdict by attaclring itself to the Supreme Court's finding that the Bear Lake County 
officers have been adjudicated as not having breached the standard of care. Defendant states "the 
only difference the Plaintiff was able to show was that Sheriff Stacy initiated the pursuit in Utah 
and continued'to follow the fleeing vehicle into Wyoming and to Idaho".(Defendant's 
Memorandum page 19). This statement alone is a classic example of the Defendant's continuous 
"spin" on the facts and on the proceedings. It also clearly exposes the Defendant's flawed theory 
and it's giving infonnation to the jury about the finding of the Supreme Court absolving the Bear 
Lake County officers. Had such been allowed at trial it would have confused the jury. The Court 
was correct in excluding the Bear Lake County officers from the special verdict fqrm. 
II. 
The Court was correct in limiting the Defendant's cross examination of the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiffnow complains of) and asserts as grounds ofa new trial, that it was limited in ifs 
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oppo:rt;unitiesof cross examination of the Plaintiff. Defendant's claim is that it should l1ave been 
allowed the opportunity to cross examine Kyle Athay about his relationships of a personal nature. 
It claims that these factors "of the Plaintiff s O"Wll choosing" negatively impacted his earning 
capacity. 
Rather than call employers, both fonner and prospective/ Defendant embarked on a course 
of character assassination. Defendant did cross exa:rrrine Kyle Athay on these issues and did elicit 
some admissions. If Defendant feels that it should have been allowed further opportunities of 
. . 
character examination" it nec1d only consult the Idaho Rules of Evidence. lRE 403 ~ould clearly 
indicate Defendant's attempted cross examination was of such' limited probative value that was far 
outweighed by the prejudiCial effects. Further, this underhanded attempt at introducing character 
evidence was improper under IRE 404. 
The Court was correct in cuttirig off further and continued cross examination oftbis nature. 
ID. 
Judgment notwithstanding the "V'erdict. 
(A) Liability Issue. 
Defendant claims the proof offered at trial is insufficient to find Rich County liable. 
Defendant points to no specific deficits except to continue to argue that ifs conduct did not differ 
, 
from that of Deputies Ludwig and Aili.ay. 
In considering the Motion on the grounds of insufficient evidence the Court is required to 
undertake a two part analJ;Sis. First, the Court should consider whether the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence and if the ends of justice would be served by vacating the verdict. Then the 
Court must consider whether a different'result would follow in a retrial. Litclifield v. Nelson 122 
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Idaho 416, 835 P.2d 651 (Idaho App. 1992). 
Simply because the evidence is in conflict is not enough to set aside the verdict and grant a 
new trial. The Court is free to weigh the conflicting evidence for itse~f. Quick v. Crane 111 Idaho 
759~ 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). Here, the jury was presented with proof; that on numerous occasions, 
despite his knowledge of me high probability-of the dangers ofms pursuit, Sheriff Stacy chose to 
continue the pursuit at numerous times and places in three states and over a distance of 63 miles. 
It was not Plaintiff's burden to show that Sheriff Stacy' 5 conduct differed from others. 
Plaintiff need only show that Sheriff Stacy's conduct violated the standard. Clearly Plaintiff did 
so and the jury agreed. 
(B) There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's economic damage award. 
This c~e is one where the jury was offered two sets of expert 'witnesses regarding 
economic losses. Plaintiff offeredbis life care·specialist and economist. Defendant also offered 
the testimony of Dr. Jansen as well as it's own oconomist. 
! 
Simple review of that record would show that the proof offered by th.e Defendant was not 
/, 
. , 
credible. For example, Def~dant's economist made claims that some of the best jobs in Bear 
Lake CODJ?ty were at the helmet factory or that Phiintiffwas.really better off since he could now 
become a teacher or a computer technician. 
The jury was free to believe any witness offered. Clearly they found the figures and proof 
offered by ~laintiff' s experts to be credible and supported by common sense. 
Defendant asks the Court to substitute it's ownjudgment for that ofllie jury. Defendant 
had full and complete opportunity to rebut evidence offered by the Plaintiff. There is no indication 
that the award arrived at by the jury was excessive or was arrived at by passion or prejudice. The, 
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, " 
Court should deny the Motion for a New Trial and/or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
Curtis v. Firth 125 Idaho 229,869 P.2d 229 (1994); Barnet v. Eagle Helicopters Inc, 123 Idaho 
361,848 P.2d419 (1993); Packardv. Joint School District Number 171,104 Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 
770 (Idaho App. 1983). 
(C) Enors,Jf any were harmless. 
An error in the admission of evidence is disregarded unless the ruling affected' a sUbstantial 
righ'\ ofthe party. Idaho School For Equal Educational Opportunity v. State, 129 P3d 1199, 142 
Idaho 459 (2005); Slackv. Kelleher 104 P.3d 958, 140 Idaho 916 (2004). 
Here there is substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's finding with regard 
to the liability o~the Defendant and the amount of Plaintiff's damages. Defendant's assertion that 
it was not allowed to cross examine the Plaintiff as it wished, or that the proof did not support they 
jury's finding of reckless disregard on Sheriff Stacy's pa:rt, did not affect substantial rights of the 
D~fendant and was harmless error. Gilbert v. City a/Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 732 P.2d 355 
(Idaho App. 1987); L&L Furniture Mart Inc. v. Boise Water Corporation, 120 Idaho 107,813 P.2d 
918 (Idaho App. 1991); Martin v. Hacf.:vl)orth, 127 Idaho ·68,896 P.2d 976 (1995). 
CONCLUSION 
, Defendant's Motions are meritless and sl}ould be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SuBMITTED this t: Z-aay of November. 2010. 
C R. JOR~ --= '-
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BtuEF IN OPPOSl110N TO MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL - 10 
2010/NOV/12/FRI 05:47 PM Crai Jorgensen FAX No. 208 237 706 P. 002 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the t. Yay of November, 2010, I served a true and corred copy 
of the foregoing pleading on the following person by the means so indicated: 
[ "-t¥1ft>t Class 
[ J Hand-Delivery 
[ ¥acsimile 
. [t'.}First Class 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ---tFacsinrile 
Peter Sfuba 
STIRBA AN» BATHA VIA Y 
P.O. ~ox 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
Alan Johnston 
PIKE HERNDON 
151 North Ridge Ave Suite 210 . 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR A 'NEW TRIAL - 11 
NOV/16/2010/TUE 05:49 PM STI & ASSOC I P.TES 
ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709) 
PIKE HERNDON STOSICH & JOHNSTON 
15] North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Telephone: (208) 528-6444 
Telefa:x:: (208) 528-6447 
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118) 
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON (Utah Bar No. 11395) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 Souili State Street, Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Telefax: (801) 364-8355 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P. 002 
2UI0 NOV I & PH ~: 43 
KERR Y HADDOCK, CLERK 
ilEPUTV_---CASENO. 




STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR 
ALTERNATNELY FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
RICH COUNTY, UTAH~ 
Case No. CV-2002-0000072 
Defendant. 
Judge Mitchell W. Brown 
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Defendant Rich County, Utah, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits the 
following Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Cour-t's Failur-e to Include Bear Lake County, Gregg Athay, Chad Ludwig and 
Deby Eborn on the Special Verdict Form Was Incorrect Under Idaho Law and A 
New Trial Should Be Granted. 
A. The Plaintiff Presented Substantial Evidence at Trial of the Causal Nexus 
Between Athay's, Ludwig's and Eborn's Negligent Actions and the Plaintiff's 
Injuries. 
Under Idaho law, it is undisputed that non-parties may be included on a special verdict 
form, just as this Court did when it included the drunk driver, Daryl Ervin ("Ervin"), on the 
special verdict form at issue. See VanBrunt v. Stoddard, 39 P .3d 621, 627 (Idaho 2001) (citing 
Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel W., Inc., 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980); Lasselle v. Special 
Products Co .• 677 P.2d 484 (Idaho 1980)). The reason for including non-parties is that "true 
apportionment cannot be achieved unless it includes all tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence 
either causing or contributing to the occurrence in question., whether or not they are parties to the 
case," Van Brunt, 39 P.3d at 627 (citing Pocatello Indus. Park, 621 P.2d at 787). Whether a non-
party's conduct was a contributing factor to the plaintiff's injuries is a question of law 
determined by considering the duty imposed on the non-patty's behavior. Id. 
In VanBrunt, the defendant, Stoddard, argued that his non-party passenger should have 
been included on the special verdict form based on the passenger's testimony at trial that he felt 
partially responsible for Stoddard's driving pattern that resulted in a collision with the Plaintiff's 
motorcycle. 39 P.3d at 627. The passenger testified that he indicated where Stoddard was 
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supposed to turn to get to a bank after which Stoddard abruptly turned and hit the Plaintiff, 
causing injury. Id. The Court stated that the passenger did not breach his duty to exercise the care 
and caution of a reasonably prudent passenger and that the passenger's testimony alone did not 
make him contributorily negligent. Id. at 628. Since there was no causal connection between the 
passenger's actions and the resultant injuries to the plaintiff. the passenger was properly 
excluded from the special verdict form. Id. 
Here) Rich County argue~ consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions in Athay 
I and Athay II that Sheriff Stacey, like Gregg Athay and Chad Ludwig, did not act with reckless 
disregard for the safety of others. Conversely, the Plaintiff repeatedly pointed to aspects of both 
Ludwig's and Athay's conduct to show that all of the officers' conduct taken together showed 
disregard for public safety that continued in the face of the lrnown risk that an accident could 
occur. For example, the Plaintiff engaged in e>...'iensive cross-examination of Chad Ludv.rig 
regarding the propriety of his use of spike strips to stop Ervin's vehicle and questioned both 
Athay and Ludwig as to why they did not abandon the pursuit entirely when it became clear that 
Ervin was not going to voluntarily stop his vehicle. 
The Athay I Court held that 1. C. § 49-623 established a reckless disregard standard of 
care for officers engaged in a police pursuit and that Ludwig's conduct did not breaoh this 
standard of care. Athay I, at 902, 906-907. The Athay II Court held that Gregg Athay's conduct 
likewise did not breach the reokless disregard standard of care. Athay II, at 333-334. However, 
regardless of the standard of care under I.C. § 49-623) "every driver of a vehicle should exercise 
due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human"powered 
vehicle ... ," and "shall exercise proper precaution upon obserVing any ... obviously confused, 
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incapacitated or intoxicated person." I.e. § 49-615 (2010). Neither the Athay I nor Athay II 
Courts took up the issue of whether Athay or Ludwig breached the duty of all drivers to exercise 
general due care and take proper precautions under I.C. § 49-615. The Plaintiff's assertion that 
"by statute [the officers] were free to be negligent toward Kyle Athay," not only ignores the law, 
but also defies rationality. )?l~ntiff's R~ply Brief, p. 5. 
There was significant evidence introduced at trial that a jury could find that Athay and 
Ludvvig breached the standard of care set forth in Le. § 49-615. 1 In this situation, the issue of 
whether the Bear Lake County officers' conduct caused or contributed to the Plaintiff's injuries 
should have been left to the jury}s consideration. See Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 726 P.2d 648, 
655 (Idaho 1985). The standard of conduct required to hold the Bear Lake County officers liable 
under I.e. § 49-623 is not the only standard that applies to the officers' conduct: police officers 
must still act with reasonable prudence and due care when they operate a vehicle even if they 
cannot be held legally liable for their negligence. See Vannoy, 726 P.2d at 655-656. The Court's 
exclusion of Ludwig, Athay and Bear Lake County from the special verdict form did not comply 
with Idaho law and substantially prejudiced Rich County thus warranting a new trial. 
B. The "Individual Rule" Only Applies In Cases of Joint and Several Liability 
and Has No Application to this Case. 
In his responsive Brief, the Plaintiff argues that the Bear Lake County officers were 
properly left off of the special verdict form because Idaho has adopted the "individual rule" for 
comparative negligence. Under Idaho law, a plaintiff may only recover damages from a party 
1 The Plaintiff's Reply Brief does not take issue with Rich County's argument that Doby Ebom also should have 
been included on the special verdict form. As Ms. Ebom was not operating a vehiclo on the evening in question, she 
plainly would not be subject to the duty imposed by I.e. § 49-615. However, there was sufficient evidence presented 
at trial to find that Ms. Ebom was negligent in failing to inform the pursuing officers of the dcor vehicle collision up 
ahead on the roadway and that the officers may havo abandoned pursuit had they known that information. It was 
legally incorrect for the cOUrt to exclude Ms. Eborn from the special verdict form and a new trial is thus appropriato. 
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whose percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility is greater than that of the plaintiff. 
1. C. § 6-80 I (20 I 0). In cases where the plaintiff seeks to recover against multiple parties under a 
theory of joint and several liability, the "individual rule" applies to determine which of the 
multiple actors' negligence or comparative responsibility exceeds the negligence or comparative 
responsibility attributed tD the plaintiff by comparing the plaintiff's fault to each individual party. 
I.e. § 803(3) (2010). 
The individual rule has no application to the instant case because Ervin, Stacey, Eborn 
and the Bear Lake County officers are not joint tortfeasors. In Athay I, the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained, "[t]wo or more persons can be joint torfeasors if they '1illite in an act which 
constitutes a vvrong to another, intending at the time to commit it, or doing it under 
circumstances Which faid y charge them with intending the consequences which follow, '" or "if 
the vvrongful conduct of each of [the actors] was a proximate cause of an indivisible injury." 
Athay v. Stacey, 128 P.3d 897, 906-907 (Idaho 2005) (quoting Griffin v. Clark, 42 P.2d 297, 
302-303 (Idaho 1935)). The Court concluded that there was "no evidence ... that Sheriff Stacey 
and Deputies Athay and Ludwig united together intending to commit a \vrong against anyone,') 
or, after concluding that Ludwig did not act with reckless disregard, that each actor engaged in 
wrongful conduct. Id. In Athay II, the Court concluded that Gregg Athay did not act with 
reckless disregard and thus he could likewise not be found jointly and severally liable for the 
Plaintiff's injuries. Athay v. Stacey, 196 P.3d 325, 333-334 (Idaho 2008). The Athay II Court 
also concluded that Ervin and Stacey were not joint tOl1ieasors because they were not pursuing a 
COtnnlon plan or design. rd. at 340. 
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Since the parties whom Rich County sought to include on the special verdict form could 
not be held jointly and severally liable to the Plaintiff, the individual rule has no application to 
tllls case. Even if the rule did apply, the rule's application would be irrelevant to the issues raised 
in Rich County's Motion for New Trial/JNOV because the jury determined that the Plaintiff did 
not contribute to his injuries and thus would be able to recover from all tortfeasors. The 
Plaintiff's argument is inconsequential to the issue of whether Bear Lake County, Ebom and the 
Bear Lake County officers should have been included on the special verdict form. 
IT. Rich Con:nty's Cross EXaJni:nation of the Plaintiff Was Improperly Limited so as to 
Warrant a New Trial 
At trial, the Plaintiff argued that the Plaintiff's paraplegia has reduced his earning 
capacity because of his physical limitations as to types of work he can actually perform and the 
fact that the Plaintiff requires more time off for medical appointments than an employee who 
does not have paraplegia and thus fewer employers are willing to hire the Plaintiff in the first 
place. The Plaintiff sought compensation for his diminished earning capacity in the form of 
economic damages to which two experts, Helen Woodard and Jerome Sherman, testified at 
length. 
On direct examination, the Plaintiff testified regarding his employment history both 
before and since the accident. The Plaintiff testified that he worked for some period of time as a 
substitute teacher at Bear Lake High School and that he enjoyed this job, but did not explain why 
he was no longer employed there other than to insinuate that it was due to a circumstance 
attendant to his paraplegia. 
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On cross examination, Rich County attempted to impeach the Plaintiff s testimony by 
asking him questions about some of the reasons for the Plaintiff losing his job with Bear Lake 
High School and the Movie Gallery that were entirely unrelated to the Plaintiff's injuries, 
including inappropriate relationships with at least two high school students while he was 
substitute teaching and similar complaints from female coworkers at Movie Gallery. Rich 
County's purpose for asking these questions was to present evidence that the Plaintiff's 
paraplegia was not wholly responsible for his diminished earning capacity and has instead been 
largely due to the Plaintiff's behavior as an employee. This evidence is directly relevant to the 
jury's determination of an economic damages award and was thus erroneously excluded, 
Rich County did not intend to cross-examine the Plaintiff on this subject to impeach his 
personal character. Any negative reflection on the Plaintiff's character that this evidence may 
have caused is purely coincidental and not of Rich County's design. The Plaintiff's argument 
that Rich County could have called the Plaintiff's former employers and coworkers is equally 
untenable, The Court excluded evidence of this subject matter on relevancy grounds, Calling a 
different witness in an attempt to elicit the same information would not change the Court's ruling 
that the evidence was irrelevant to the issues presented at trial. 
Damages was undoubtedly a significant issue in the Plaintiff's case and among the 
damages sought was the Plaintiff s reduced earning capacity. However> the Plaintiff is not 
entitled to compensation for his alleged inability to secure and maintain gainful employment if 
this inability stems from reasons entirely unrelated to the Plaintiff's injuries, his physical 
limitations and attendant medical needs. Rich County was entitled to present evidence and crossN 
examine the Plaintiff as to these reasons, particularly because this evidence had been previously 
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substantiated during the Plaintiff's own deposition. Without this testimony, the jury did not have 
all of 1110 relevant information to correctly award the Plaintiff economic damages for diminished 
earning capacity to Rich County's substantial prejudice. A neW trial is appropriate to allow Rich 
County to present this evidence to rebut the Plaintiff's testimony. 
m. The Plaintiff Does Not Dispute Rich County's Arguments Regarding the Court's 
Failure to Instruct the Jury o:n the Law of the Case. 
The Plaintiff>s Reply Brief in Opposition to Motion for a New Trial contains no 
arguments or other mch response to Rich County's assertion that the Court's failure to instruct 
the jury on the relevant law of the case was legally incorrect and high prejudicial to Rich County 
and should thus warrant a new trial. It must be assumed that the Plaintiff does not dispute Rich 
County's argument and the Court should decide 111i8 issue based on the Plaintiff's Motion for 
New TriallJNOV alone. 
Briefly, the Court should have instructed the jury as to the Idaho Supreme Court's 
determinations in Athay I and Athay II that both Athay' s and Ludwig's conduct did not amount 
to reckless disregard. When the Idaho Supreme Court "states in its opinion a principle or rule of 
law necessary to the decision, such pronoUncement becomes the law of the case and much be 
adhered to throughout its subsequent progress," including in a trial court on remand, Swanson v. 
Swanson,5 P.3d 973, 976 (Idaho 2000) (citing Suitts V. Fitst Sec. Bank: ofIdaho, 713 P.2d 1374, 
1380 (Idaho 1985)). The trial court is charged with ensuring a remanded case is tried "in light of 
and in conSOllance with" the law of that particular case. rd. (citing Creem v. Northwestern Mut. 
Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash., 74 P.2d 702, 703 (Idaho 1937)). 
This trial was not conducted "in light of/' and in accord with the law of this case due to 
the Court's failure to instruct the jury that Athay and Ludwig did not act with reckless disregard 
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for the safety of others. The law of this case is mat mere is nothing that Lud'Wig or Athay did or 
f<;riled to do that amounted to reckless disregard. Rich County should have been able to point out 
that fact in its closing argument as a way of telling the jury that they must fmd something 
different and more egregious about Stacey's conduct in order to conclude that he acted with 
reckless disregard and thereby hold Rich County liable because this is the law of the case as 
pronounced by the Idaho Supreme Court. At the very least, the Court should have instructed the 
jury on this point because it is truly not argument; it is simply the law that must be abided by in 
this matter. Rich County should be granted a new trial because the Court failod to instruct the 
jury and conduct the trial in consonance ,vith the established and relevant law of me case to Rich 
County's substantial prejudice. 
IV. There Is Insufficient Evidence to Support the Jury's Finding that Sheriff 
Stacey Acted With Reckless Disregard a"d the Jury's Eco"olnic Damages 
Award. 
In order to prevail at trial, the Plaintiff was required to show that Sheriff Stacey acted 
with reckless disregard for the safety of others or, said another way. that Sheriff Stacey breached 
the duty of care set forth under I.e. § 49-623, To meet his burden, the Plainti£fwas required to 
present evidence that Sheriff Stacey had actual knowledge of the high probability that another 
motorist could be hit and seriously injured by the fleeing motorist and despite that knowledge, 
continued his course of conduct. The Plaintiff also needed to show that Sheriff Stacey's conduct 
in pursuing a fleeing, intoxicated motorist created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm. Rich 
County cannot be held liable because the Plaintiff presented no evidence that Stacey's conduct 
was different and more egregious than Ludwig's or Athay' s appropriate and not reckless 
conduct 
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The sole distinction between Stacey's conduct and that of the other officers drawn by the 
Plaintiff was that Sheriff Stacey initiated the pursuit in Utah and continued to follow the fleeing 
vehicle into Wyoming and into Idaho. However, in finding that Ludwig and Athay's conduct did 
not amount to reckless disregard, the Idaho Supreme Court already determined that the pursuit 
was justified and thus initiating it could not amount to reckless disregard, Therefore, at trial the 
Plaintiff failed to establish that Sheriff Stacey acted with reckless disregard and the Court should 
set aside the jury's verdict and grant Rich County's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. 
Also, the jury's $2,720,126.00 economic damages award is unsupported by the evidence 
introduced at trial. Based on the Plaintiff's economic damages evidence, including projections 
of economic loss, projection of the present value of Plaintiff's life care plan, and the plaintiffs 
medical bills, it is unclear how the Jury reached the $2,720,126.00 figure, particularly since the 
Plaintiff testified that there were a number of projected costs that he has not and would likely 
never incur, such as further education and training, home care, etc. thereby preventing the jury 
from awarding compensation for these items. Since the economic dan1age award is against the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence produced at trial, the Court should enter judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict as to this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Rich County respectfully requests that its Motion for New Trial 
or Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict be granted. 
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DATED this IIL~ day of November, 2010. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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151 North Ridge Ave.) Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Telephone: (208) 528-6444 
Telefax: (208) 52&-6447 
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118) 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Telefax: (801) 364-8355 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FAX No. 801 36 55 
IN THE SIXTH J1JDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




RICH COUNTY, UTAH. 
Defendant. 
The State of Idaho to: CT Corporation System 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
[Verizon Wireless] 
Case No. CV-02-00072 
Judge Mitchell W. Brovvn 
Verizon Wireless Services, LLC Registered Agent (Idaho) 
1111 W. Jefferson Suite 530 
Boise, ID 83702 
P. 004 
NOV/17/2010/WED 08: AM STI ASSOCIATES FAX No, 801 36 55 P. 005 
YOU ARE COJ\1MANDED: 
[] to appear in the Court at the place, date and time specified below to testifY in the 
above case. 
[] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testifY at the taking of a 
deposition in the above case. 
[X] to produce or copy the following documents, including electronically stored 
information in your possession, custody, or control and mail or deliver to R. Blake 
Hamilton at the law offices of Stirba & Associates at the place, date and time specified 
below. 
1. Any and all cellular phone records, which are dated or were p:repared 
between July 1,2010 and October 1,2010, retained for Verizon Wireless 
cellular customer Kyle Athay, Wireless Nmnber (208) 251-0668, including, 
but not limited to: 
a. Billing records. 
b. Call detail records. 
C. Te)..1; detail and content records. 
d. Photos or other phone data stored online or electronically. 
e. Subscriber information. 
[] to permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time specified 
below. 
NOV /1 7/201 O/WED 08: 29 AM STI & P.sSOCIATES FAX No, 801 36 
PLACE, DATE AND TIME: 
Place: Stirba & Associates 
215 South State Street 
Suite 750 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Date: November 16,2010 
Time: 5:00 p,tn,. 
5 p, 006 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified 
above, or to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be 
held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of 
$100.00 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
DATED this ~-.::::;::..........day of November, 2010. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
PE1ER STIRBA 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON 
Attorneys For Defendant 
lSTRICT COURT 
H JUDICIAL COURT 
No BEAR LAKE COUNTY)~HO 
V t<6 ;J.DiO .: 5 Orr--
DAT~ TIME I 
CLERK 
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On November 18, 2010, counsel for the above-named Plaintiff, Craig R. Jorgensen, counsel 
for the Defendant, Peter Stirba and Alan Johnston, appeared for further proceedings. Dorothy Snarr 
acted as court reporter for this proceeding. 
This matter was set for Defendant Rich County's Motion for New Trial dealing with ex 
parte communications, Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment 
Notwithstanding Verdict, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for New Trial and 
Motion to Shorten Time. 
The Court advised that it would first take up Defendant's Motion for New Trial arising out 
of the ex parte communications involving the Plaintiff and the Court's courtroom clerk, Brandy 
Peck. The Court reiterated the parameters concerning what areas the parties would be allowed to 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 1 
inquire which were enunciated in the previous hearing. The Court heard Rich County's objections 
to these limitations, overmled the same and proceeded with the evidentiary hearing regarding this 
motion. Counsel for Defendant requested the prospective witnesses be excused from the courtroom 
pending their testimony and the Court GRANTED said motion without objection from Plaintiff. 
An evidentiary hearing was held regarding the Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Mr. 
Stirba called Brandy Peck, who was sworn and testified under direct and cross. Following the 
witness's testimony, counsel for the Defendant requested a closed conference with only the Court, 
staff and counsel. The courtroom was cleared of witnesses and spectators. Mr. Stirba renewed his 
Motion for Limited Disqualification of the Court and provided argument. Mr. Jorgensen 
responded. The Court DENIED the motion and set forth its rationale on the record. 
Counsel for the Defendant called Kyle Athay, who was sworn and testified under direct and 
cross. The Defendant called Blake Ifamilton, who testified by telephone. Mr. Hamilton was sworn 
and testified under direct and cross. Defendant's counsel offered Exhibit A, a 302 page summary of 
the Plaintiff, Kyle Athay's cell phone records from Verizon Wireless. The records were not 
received by Defendant's counsel at their office in Utah until today because of time constraints 
regarding the subpoena process of procuring the records from Verizon. Mr. Stirba will overnight 
copies of the exhibit to the Court and opposing counsel and requested the exhibit be admitted. Mr. 
Jorgensen reserved his objection until after receipt of the exhibit. The Court reserved ruling on the 
admission of the evidence until after it is received and reviewed by opposing counsel. Following 
argument on the motion, the Court will take this matter under advisement after Exhibit A is 
received and reviewed. 
The Court heard argument on the Defendant's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 2 
Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict and the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Defendant's Motion for 
New Trial. 
Following argument on the motions, the Court will take all the Issues UNDER 
ADVISEMENT and issue a decision in due course. SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2010. 
Sixth District Judge 
CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the dJ~ day of November, 2010, I mailed/served a true copy of 
the foregoing document on the attorney(s) / person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage 
thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered. 
ATTORNEY(S) / PERSON(S) 
Craig R. Jorgensen 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 4904 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904 
Peter Stirba 
Blake Hamilton 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Alan Johnston 
E.W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 




Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
BY~~ 
De uty Clerk 
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ZUII fEB -I PM 2: 33 
KERRY HADDOCK. CLERK 
JEPIJTY-____ .CASENO. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendant's, ru.ch County, 
Utah (Rich County), Motion for a New Trial. Rich County claims it is entitled to a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.! In addition to the 
Motion for aNew Trial, a number of ancillary motions have arisen. These motions are: 
(1) Rich County's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Limited Disqualification of Judge I and Further Brief in Opposition to Motion for 
I Rich County has also filed a Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. This is an entirely separate and distinct motion and will be addressed in a separate Memorandum 
Decision and Order. 
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New Trial; (2) Rich County's Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Jennifer Attebery, Ann 
Marie Hysell, Amy Burns, Cheryl Leann Shuler, Michael Jay Skerrit, and Cheri Ann 
Nichols (hereinafter Motion to Strike Juror Affidavits); and (3) Rich Countts Motion to 
Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendant' 8 Motion for New Trial. 
This matter proceeded to hearing on November 18, 2010. This hearing not only consisted 
of oral argument on the motion, but included the submission of evidence, both 
testimonial and documentary evidence. Following this argument the Court took the 
matter under advisement. However, following the evidentiary hearing and oral 
arguments, additional matters were submitted and objected to; therefore, the Court 
actually took this matter in its entirety under advisement on December 3, 2010. The 
Court now issues its decision regarding the motions identified above. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In July of 2010 a ten (10) day jury trial was conducted in Pocatello, Idaho.2 
Following the jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, Kyle Athay 
(Athay). 
On September 16, 2010, the Court conducted a status conference. At said status 
conference the Court advised the parties that it had learned that during the course of trial 
and after the completion of the trial there had been ex parte communications between the 
Court's courtroom clerk, Brandy Peck (Peck), and Athay and the representative of Rich 
County, Sheriff Dale Stacey and his wife. The Court advised the parties of the nature and 
extent of those communications as the Court understood them at that time. See 
Transcript of proceedings conducted on September 16, 2010. 
2. Venue in this matter was changed for trial purposes only pursuant to stipulation of the parties from Bear 
Lake to Bannock County. 
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On October 1, 2010, ruch County filed its Motion for New Trial, alleging that the 
ex parte communications constituted an irregularity and that the Court should grant its 
request for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On October 8, 2010, the Court entered Judgment relative to the Jury's Verdict 
rendered incident to the jury trial in this matter. 
DISCUSSION 
The Court will first address the ancillary motions and then address Rich County's 
Motion for a New Trial. 
1. Motion to Strike Plaintiffs ... Further Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for New Trial 
Rich County has moved to Strike that portion of Athay' s Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge I And Further Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for New Trial, dealing with the Motion for New Trial. This brief 
was filed on November 3, ,2010, only one day before the hearing on said motion was 
scheduled to be heard. The basis for Rich County's objection and Motion to Strike is that 
Athay had previously submitted a reply brief to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. See 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief to Defendant!s Motion for New Trial filed on October 13, 2010. 
Rich County submits that Athai s conduct is in violation of the rules of motion practice 
outlined in Rule 7 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically Rule 7(b)(3)(E) 
which provides as follows: 
Any brief submitted in support of a motion shall be filed with the court, 
and served so that it is received by the parties, at least fourteen (14) days 
prior to the hearing. Any responsive brief shall be filed with the court, and 
served so that it is received by the parties, at least seven (7) days prior to 
the hearing. Any reply brief shall be filed with the court, and served so 
that it is received by the parties! at least two (2) days prior to the hearing, 
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The hearing on the Motion for a New Trial was originally set for argument on November 
4, 2010. However, it was not argued to the Court until November 18, 2010.3 As such, 
Rich County had fourteen (14) days in which to address and respond to any arguments 
asserted by Athay and/or amy case law cited to and relied upon by Athay. 
The Court recognizes and agrees with Rich County's interpretation of LR.C.P 
7(b)(3)(E). Athay's submission of that portion of its brief titled Further Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for New Trial was beyond the scope of what is contemplated by 
Rule 7. Rule 7 clearly allows for only one "responsive brief' to be filed by the non-
moving party and that it shall be filed at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing. 
However, the Court does not intend to strike this submission. Rich County, as 
stated above, had notice of the arguments and case law being relied upon by Athey. 
These issues were argued and responded to at the time of the hearing. Most importantly 
this Court does not intend to be limited in its ability to conduct its own independent 
research regarding this issue. Certainly any law that the Court fmds in conducting this 
research it intends to utilize and rely upon in addressing Rich County's Motion for a New 
Trial. 
As stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 
290,296, 882 P.2d 457,463 (Ct.App.1994): 
This Court recognizes the importance of the civil rules concerning the 
time requirements for filing and service of motions. We do not condone a 
litigant's disregard of these time restrictions. However, the purpose of 
such rules is to provide sufficient notice of issues to be addressed and 
relief sought so that the opposing party may adequately prepare to present 
its position. The notice rules are not jurisdictional ... 
3 The reason this motion wall continued until November 18) 2010 was the requirement of the rule that the 
Court first address and rule on the Motion for Limited Disqualification before it had jurisdiction to take up 
any other issue. See LR.C.P 40(d)(5). 
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This Court agrees with this statement. Further, the Court concludes that based the 
manner in which the timing of the hearing played out, due to the Motion for Limited 
Disqualification, Rich County had adequate notice of any additional arguments and law 
cited to by Athay and adequate opportunity to prepare to meet and address those 
arguments and the law. Therefore. the Court finds that no prejudice has occurred and that 
Rich County's Motion to Strike that portion of Athay's Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge / And Further Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for New Trial, dealing with the Motion for New Trial is hereby 
DENIED. 
2. Motion to Strike Juror Affidavits. 
Rich County has also filed its Motion to Strike Juror Affidavits. The basis for this 
motion is again based upon the untimeliness of their submission. The hearing on Rich 
County's Motion for a New Trial was conducted on November 18, 2010. At the time of 
the argument the Court inquired concerning whether either party had interviewed and was 
planning to submit testimony in accordance with Rule 606(b) of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence concerning "whether [any] extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror." Both parties advised that no interviews with jurors had 
been conducted and that there would be no testimony concerning such extraneous 
prejudicial information. 
Eleven (11) days after the hearing~ on November 29, 2010, Athay filed the 
Affidavits of six (6) jurors l Michael Jay Skerritt, Cheryl Leann Shuler, Ann Marie Hysell, 
<jqo 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AN ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL· 5 
Amy Burns, Cheri Ann Nichols and Jennifer Attebery. On December 1, 2010, Rich 
County filed its Motion to Strike the juror affidavits. 
Rich County's Motion for a New Trial is brought pursuant to Rule 59(a)(l) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically. Rich County argues that due to 
irregularities in the proceedings of this jury trial, the ex parte communications· between 
Peck and Athay) Rich County is entitled to a new trial. Rule 59(c) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure deals with the issue of the time requirements for submitting affidavits 
either in support of or in opposition to a motion for a new trial brought pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 59. This rule provides as follows: 
When a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has fourteen (14) days after such 
service within which to serve opposing affidavits} which period may be 
extended for an additional period not exceeding twenty one (21) days 
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written 
stipulation. The court may pennit reply affidavits. 
With respect to the present motion Rich County did not file any affidavits in 
support of its motion for a new trial. However, it did file its motion and supporting 
memorandum on October 1, 2010. Therefore, this Court concludes that LR.C.P. 59(c) 
requires that Athai s submissions in opposition to this motion for new trial, including 
affidavits, were required to be filed on or before October 15, 2010. In fact, Athay did file 
his Reply Brief to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and the Affidavit of Kyle Athay 
on October 13,2010. 
However, Athay did not file the juror affidavits until after the November 18,2010 
hearing on this motion. Nor did Athay move the Court in a timely fashion and upon good 
cause shown for an additional twenty one (21) days. Therefore, it is clear that the juror 
affidavits in question were not submitted in a timely fashion under I.R.C.P. 59(0). 
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Unfortunately the Court concludes that it must strike the juror affidavits flIed by 
Athay in this proceeding. Despite the Court's belief that the juror affidavits would be 
extremely enlightening on the issue of whether or not any of the jurors observed any of 
the inappropriate conduct involving Athay and Peck and whether or not any 
impermissible contact was brought to bear upon them by way of Athay or Peck, Athay's 
failure to comply with the procedures prescribed by the Idaho Rules of Evidence and the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure preclude the Court from considering these juror 
affidavits. Athay did not file these affidavits within the fourteen (14) days allotted by 
Rule 59(c). Neither did Athey request an additional twenty one (21) days as allowed by 
the rule upon a showing of "good cause," Rather, Athay disregarded the procedure and 
filed the affidavits eleven (11) days after the hearing on this motion. 
In Watson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 650, 827 P.2d 656,663 
(1992) the Idaho Supreme Court while addressing this issue stated as follows: 
Watson also appeals the decision of the district court declining to 
reconsider its order to grant a new trial in light of the second set of juror 
affidavits. Watson's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order 
granting a new trial was based on I.R.C.P. 59(e) 60(b)(1), (3) and (6) and 
was made nearly a year after the initial motion for new trial had been filed 
by International Harvester. At the time Watson submitted the second set 
of ten juror affidavits, including five supplemental affidavits from the 
jurors relied upon by International Harvester in its initial motion for new 
trial. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider on the ground that 
Watson had ample opportunity to raise all of the issues and present the 
new evidence in the form of juror affidavits when International 
Harvester's motion for a new trial was previously argued. The trial court 
correctly ruled that Watson bad not complied with the time 
requirements of I.R.e.p. 59(c) in filing tbe affidavits opposing 
International Harvester's motion for new trial and it did not err in 
refusing to consider Watson's second set of affidavits. [Emphasis 
Added] 
J/-qd.-
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In the present case, the rule is clear regarding the time lines associated with the 
submissions of affldavits both in support of and in opposition to a motion for a new trial 
under LR.C.P. 59. Those timelines were not complied with by Athay with respect to the 
juror affidavits, It would contravene the clear objectives of the rule to allow those 
affidavits for consideration at this stage of the proceedings on the motion for a new trial. 
Further, it would prejudice the rights of Rich County to prepare to defend against these 
affidavits, either by way of argument or submission of its own affidavits. For these 
reasons the Court will GRANT Rich County' 5 Motion to Strike the Juror Affidavits and 
the same will be stricken from the record and will not be considered by the Court with 
respect to Rich County's Motion for a New Trial. 
;t. Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to I)efendant~ 
Motion for a New Trial 
Following argument on Rich County's Motion for New Trial on November 18, 
2010, Athay filed a Motion to File an Additional Brief and a Supplemental Brief in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. Both of these submissions were filed 
on November 30, 2010~ roughly twelve (12) days after the hearing on Rich County's 
motion. Rich County filed its motion to strike these submissions on December 2,2010. 
Utilizing the same analysis used above as it relates to section 1 of this 
Memorandum Decision and Order, this Court must GRANT Rich County's Motion to 
Strike Athay's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
This Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial was filed 
after the hearing and after the time requirements established by J.R.C.P. 7. Rich County 
did not have an opportunity to consider the arguments and the authority submitted by 
Athay in this brief. Nor did Rich County have an opportunity to reply to the arguments 
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and authority submitted in that submission. Inasmuch as Rich County has not been 
afforded an opportunity to respond, the Court will GRANT Rich County's Motion and 
Strike the Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and 
will not consider the same in its deliberation related to Rich County's Motion for a New 
Trial. 4 
Rich County's Motion for a New Trial 
A. Failure to Support Motion for New Trial with Affidavits. 
Rich County filed its Motion for a New Trial on October 1> 2010. In support of 
this motion Rich County submitted its Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial. This Memorandum was likewise filed on October 1, 2010. 
Rule 59 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure controls the procedure for filing 
motions for a new trial. Specifically Rule 59(a)(7) provides that: 
[A ]ny motion for a new trial based upon any of the grounds set forth in 
subdivision 1, 2, 3, or 4 must be accompanied by an affidavit stating in 
detail the facts relied upon in support of such motion for a new trial .... 
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that it is mandatory that a party seeking a 
new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(I) must comply with the affidavit requirement of 
LR.C.P.59(a)(7). See Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc" 2010 WL 5186683 
(December 23, 2010) (Kuhn) and Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 
341, 347 (2008). In Kuhn, the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows: 
We affirm the district court's denial of appellants' Rule 59(a)(l), (4), (6) 
and (7) motions for a new trial because appellants failed to file the 
required documentation within the time lines set out in the rule. A motion 
for a new trIal under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1) and (4) "must be accompanied by 
4 Despite the Court's ruling in this matter, the Court continues to reserve the right to conduct its own 
independent research regarding the issues raised in this motion and to the extent it deems appropriate rely 
upon any case Jawor other appropriate authority in rendering its decision. 
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an affidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon in support of such motion 
for the new trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7) (emphasis added). Affidavits 
supporting a motion for new trial must be served with the motion. Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 59(c). Appellants! motion for a new trial was not accompanied 
by an affidavit and, thus, was procedurally defective. Johannsen, 146 
Idaho at 429, 196 PJd at 347. As such, the court properly denied 
appellants I rule 59(a)(1) and (4) motions for a new trial. 
2010 WL 5186683 at p. 4. 
This Court has previously struck the juror affidavits submitted by Athay that were 
filed in opposition to the Rich County's Motion for a New Trial based upon Athay's non-
adherence to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 59(e) and the Court's similar adherence to 
procedure also leads to the conclusion that Rich County's Motion for New Trial pursuant 
to LR.C.P. 59(a)(1) is procedurally defective for its failure to support the motion with an 
affidavit. As such the Court must DENY Rich County's Motion for a New Trial based 
upon its procedural defects.s 
B. Merits of Rich County's Motion for a New Trial. 
However, the Court also feels compelled, based upon the allegations of 
irregularity and ex parte communications involving Peck, to address the merits of Rich 
County's request for a new trial. 
On two separate occasions the Court set forth in detail to the parties the nature 
and extent of the communications that occurred between Peck and Athay as related to 
the Court by his clerk. See Transcript of proceedings conducted on September 16) 2010 
5 The Court recognizes that Rich County did tile an Affidavit of R. Blake Hamilton in Support of 
Defendant Rich County's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial. However, the title of 
this affidavit belies the underlying procedural problem with said affidavit. The affidavit was not filed 
contemporaneous with the Motion for a New Trial as is· required by LR.C.P. 59(a)(7). This defect is 
jurisdictional to it Motion for a New Trial brought pursuant to l.R.C.P. 59(a)(1). 
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and Transcript of proceedings on Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge, pp. 24-
On November 18, 2010) the Court held a hearing on Rich Countis Motion for a 
New Trial which included an evidentiary hearing where Peck and Athay were both sworn 
and testified. 
In considering a party's motion for a new trial Rule 59(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure "allows a trial court to grant a new trial 'on all or part of the issues' in an 
action where there was an • [i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party ... by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.'!! S[aathaug v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 708) 979 P.2d 107, 110 (1999) (Slaathaug). In 
exercising its discretion the Court must: (1) correctly perceive the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) act within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistent with the 
legal principles applicable to specific choices; and (3) the trial court's decision must be 
the product ofreasoned decision making. Schaeffer v. Curtis-Perrin, 141 Idaho 356,358, 
109 PJd 1098, 1100 (2005); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr, v. Idaho Power Co.} 119 Idaho 
87) 94, 803 P .2d 993, 1000 (1991). If the Court properly exercises its discretion as 
outlined above, the appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's decision. Id. at 94. 
In Slaathaug the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the evolution of the case law 
dealing with a motion for new trial under I.R.C.P 59(a)(1). It traced this evolution back 
to the case of Rueth v. State~ 100 Idaho 203, 208,596 P.2d 75,80 (1979) (Rueth).7 In 
5 The Court has since learned that the communications were even more extensive than the Court was 
originally lead to believe. This has been well documented in the submissions as well as the evidentiary 
hearing conducted on November 18, 2010. See Transcript of Hearing on Motions dated November 18) 
2010. 
7 Reuth dealt with the ex parte communications of the trial judge rather than the ex parte communication of 
the judges court room clerk which is the circumstance in the present case, 
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Slaathaug the Supreme Court noted that it had adopted the "four prong analysis" 
enunciated in Reuth Hin determining [if] irregularities Were sufficient to warrant granting 
a new trial.~' 13 2 Idaho at 710. 
The "four prong analysis" set forth in Reuth provides as follows: 
(l) It is for the losing party, in the first instances to show that there was 
some communication off the record and not in open court. (2) The burden 
then shifts to the winning party to show what the communication was. If 
he cannot show What it was. the verdict must be set aside. (3) If he can 
show what the communication was but it appears to have been of such a 
character that it may have affected the jury, then the verdict must be set 
aside. (4) Only if it is made clearly to appear that the communication 
could not have had any effectl can the verdict be allowed to stand. 
100 Idaho at 209. 
In the present circumstance there is no dispute that prong number 1 of the Reuth 
analysis has been met. It was established without question when the Court disclosed the 
irregularity to the parties on September 18, 2010. Therefore, pursuant to the Reuth 
analysis the burden then shifted to Athay "to show what the communication was. It As 
established by Reuth, if he cannot establish what the communication was then "the 
verdict must be set aside/' 
In an effort to meet this shifting of burdens, Athay submitted his affidavit. In this 
affidavit he states that a few days after the trial commenced he met Brandy Perkins. 8 
Affidavit Kyle Athay, p.l, ~ 3. He claims that he and Peck exchanged social pleasantries. 
Jd p.2, '3. This initial meeting took place during a break in the proceedings. ld at p. 1, 
~ 3. Athay continues that either that same day or the next day, again during a break, he 
and Peck spoke and exchanged telephone numbers. Jd. at p.2, 1 4. Athey states that 
8 Throughout his affidavit Athay refers to the Court's courtroom clerk as Brandy Perkins. Her actual name 
is Brandy Peck. Any references in Athay's Affidavit are actually references to Peck 
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"thereafter we would telephone each other or text each other when the trial was not in 
session." Id. at p.2,,-r 5. He further states that since he traveled from Montpelier, Idaho 
to trial in Pocatello every day that they may have talked or texted during my trips home) 
but mainly when I was at home.') Id 
Athay further states that: 
At no time did we ever discuss the case and the trial. Ms. Perkins did not 
communicate anything to me that she knew with regard to the judge's and 
jury's activities, thinking or court proceedings. At no time did I inquire of 
her about the case. I recall one occasion when she asked me how I 
thought the case would go. r responded r had "no clue," The calls were 
about our children and their activities. Ms. Perkins was upbeat in our 
conversations and that was helpful to me. I thought Ms. Perkins' role was 
limited to "swearing people in." Our relationship was entirely casual. 
I did not discuss my contacts with Ms. Perkins with my attorney. The 
contact was BO mundane, social in nature, and so unrelated to the case I did 
not feel it was important. ... I observed Ms. Perkins having conversations 
with many people connected with the trial. I did not sense our contact was 
any different. I had no contact or communication with Judge Brown or 
any Juror except during proceedings in open court. 
Jd, at pp. 3, ~ 6 and 8. 
The evidentiary hearing held by the Court on November 18, 2010 in which both 
Peck and Athay testified; confirmed the extent of the ex parte communications between 
Peck and Athay. In addition, it also established without question that both had 
significantly understated the extent of these ex parte communications in their prior 
disclosures,!) The evidence established that there had been signifioant contact via cell 
phones and text messaging both during the course of the trial as well as after the jury 
verdict had been rendered. It established that there were communications both during the 
9 Peck had previously had conversations with the Court, which were made known on the record to the 
parties and their counsel during the hearings of September 18, 2010 and the November 4, 2010. 
<J1g 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR TIHA 1. 
course of the day during trial as well as after hours. It was established that the parties had 
downloaded photographs and forwarded photographs via text messaging. It was even 
established that there is a possibility that one text message was sent during the time frame 
that the Court and counsel were addressing and dealing with a question from the jury 
during its deliberations. 
Despite this gross misconduct on the part of Peck and AthaY1 they both are 
consistent in their claims that their communication about the case was limited to 
generalized questions such as how do you think it is going or what do you think the jury 
will do. There is no evidence to establish that Peck communicated to Athay or that Athay 
communicated to his attorney any information concerning matters that Peck may have 
been privy to through her association with the Court. Additionally both testified that no 
such communications occurred. There is no evidence to establish that Peck or Athay 
communicated in an impermissible fashion with any members of the jury or that any 
members of the jury observed or knew of these inappropriate communications between 
Peck and Athay. There is no evidence in the record, despite the gross misconduct of 
Athay and Peck, that it had any negative effect on the parties receiving a fair trial. There 
is no indication in the record that any of the critical players were in any way influenced 
by these ex parte communications1 not the judge, not the jury1 not the attorneys for the 
respective parties. 
Based upon the Affidavit of Kyle Athay and the testimony presented at the 
November 18,2010 hearing, the Court concludes that Athay has effectively rebutted the 
presumption of prejudice or as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Slaathaug, Athay 
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has established "that the conduct could not have affected the outcome of the trial." 132 
Idaho at 710. 
Rich County has argued, both in its written submissions and in oral argument at 
the hearing, that the Rueth presumption cannot be rebutted absent a verbatim 
reproduction of the contents of all telephone communication by way of text or otherwise. 
See Memorandum in Support of Defendant Rich County's Motion for a New Trial, p.5 
C'The communication Was in the form of text messages. These written communications 
must be produced to Defendant.") and Defendant Rich County's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for New Trial, p. 6 C'Here, the Plaintiff admits he is unable to 
disclose, precisely what the communications were. . . . Without full disclosure of the 
improper communication's content, particularly during the trial, Rich County cannot 
conclude that the jury's deliberations and verdict were not affected by Peck's relationship 
with the Plaintiff. ") 
However, the Court does not accept Rich County's contention that the standard 
announced in Rueth and applied by the Idaho Supreme Court is as rigid as argued by Rich 
County. It would appear that Rich County would have the standard be a per se rule; that 
if it cannot be shown "precisely" what the communication was then prejudice is 
presumed and reversal is warranted. However, Rueth rejected such a harsh rule holding 
that "a Per se rule requiring reversal in all instances would appear to be unwise," 1 DO 
Idaho at 207. The Reuth Court also noted that "it 1s not without reason that procedural 
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irregularities involving communication between the trial court and jury are judged by a 
far stricter standard than those between jurors and other court officials." 10 
This Court concludes. in the exercise of its discretion, that Athay has met his 
burden of "showing what the communi.cation was"~ prong two of the Reuth test. 
Although the verbatim texts cannot be retrieved and there are no transcripts of the 
conversations between Peck and Athay, the content and nature of the communications are 
clear. The communications were in pursuit of a "friendship" or "social relationship." 
Although the extent of the communications was grossly understated by both parties, there 
is no evidence and no reason for this Court to find that they in any way diminished the 
integrity of the actual trial proceeding, as such the fourth prong of the Rueth test has been 
met and the verdict shall be allowed to stand .. 
Although this Court is troubled and embarrassed by the fact that these breaches of 
the Idaho Judicial Cannons occurred on its watch. this Court concludes, after a close 
review of this matter, that the record before it establishes that while an irregularity in the 
proceedings did occur> neither "party was prevented from having a fair trial" which is the 
standard enunciated in LR.C.P 59(1'1)(1). Therefore, the Court will DENY Rich Countis 
Motion for a New Trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court hereby DENIES Rich Counti s 
Motion to Strike ... Further Brief in Opposition to New Trial filed by Athay. In addition, 
the Court GRANTS Rich County's Motion to Strike Juror Affidavits and also GRANTS 
10 In this instance the communications did not involve the judge. There is also no evidence that the 
communications involved the jury either collectively or individually. The oommunications were limited to 
a courtroom clerk, Peck, and the Plaintiff, Athay. 
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Rich County's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial, Finally, the Court will DENY Rich County's Motion 
for a New Trial filed pursuant to LR.C.P. 59(a)(1) both for its procedural defects as well 
as the substantive record before the Court on this motion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEn thIs I ~ay of February, 2011. 
District Judge 
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This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendant's, Rich County, 
Utah (Rich County), Motion for a New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. In conjunction with this motion the Plaintiff, Kyle Athay 
CAthay) filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for New Trial and Memorandum. 
Both parties have filed briefs in support of and in opposition to these respective motions. 
The Court will fIrst address Athat s Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for 
New Trial and Memorandum. 
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1. ATHAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
Athey has moved to strike Rich County~s Motion for New Trial or Alternatively 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the grounds that Rich County's motion is 
procedurally defective pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 59(a)(7) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that "any 
motion based on subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth the factual grounds therefore with 
particularity." 
Athay relies upon the cases of Nation v, Bonner Bldg. Supply, 113 Idaho 568, 746 
P.2d 1027 (Ct.App.1987) (Nation) and Hells Canyon Excursion Inc. v. Oakes, 111 Idaho 
123, 721 P.2d 223 (Ct.App.1986) (Hells Canyon). The Court finds that the Hells Canyon 
case provides no significant guidance on this issue. However, the Nation case appears to 
be nearly identical, procedurally to the case at bar. In Nation, seven (7) days after 
judgment had been entered "Nation's attorney filed and served a motion for new trial'" 
113 Idaho at 570.1 "The motion requested simply 'that the Plaintiff be granted a new trial 
... upon ... grounds that will be set forth during hearing of this matter.'" Id. At the 
hearing the Defendant challenged the procedural defects in, Plaintiff s motion, namely the 
failure to state with particularity the grounds upon which a new trial was being sought. 
The trial court, rather than finding the motion for new trial to be procedurally defective 
and striking the same, set a briefing schedule allowing Nation to supplement its motion 
by arguing with particularity in a supplemental brief that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the jury verdict. 
I At the time of this case, the time requirement in whicb to file a motion for a new trial was ten (10) days. 
Under the current rule it is fourteen (14) days. 
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This is much the same circumstance the Court is faced with. In this case, Rich 
County filed its Motion for New Trial on October 22,2010. The Court entered judgment 
on the jury's verdict on October 8, 2010. Therefore, Rich Countis Motion for New Trial 
WaS filed on the fourteenth day after judgment was entered and was timely pursuant to 
Rule 59(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However, like the motion for new trial 
in Nation, Rich County's motion does not set forth with particularity the factual grounds 
for its motion. On November 5,2010, Rich County filed its Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. In this memorandum, Rich County does set forth with particularity its factual 
grounds for requesting a new triaL 
The Court, after reading the Nation decision concludes that the decision rather 
than supporting Athay's position that the Court should strike Rich County's Motion for a 
New Trial, supports a conclusion that the Court should not strike Rich County's Motion 
for a New Trial. In Nation the Idaho Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
Bonner contends that the district judge lacked jurisdiction to grant a new 
trial because Nations' motion, although filed within ten days of judgment, 
did not satisfy the particularity requirement during the ten day period. It is 
well established that a trial court lacks the authority to consider a motion 
which is not timely under Ru1e 59(b). [Citations Omitted] However, it is 
not so clear that the ten-day period is a jurisdictional cutoff for satisfying 
the particularity requirement under Rule 59(a). 
113 Idaho at 570. In resolving this question the Court of Appeals states as follows: 
Policy considerations aside, Bonner argues that the case law ties the 
particularity requirement to the timeliness requirement. We find no such 
explicit nexus. 
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113 Idaho at 571. The Court of Appeals goes on to conclude that the trial court, in ~e 
exercise of its discretion, could "deny a nonparticularized motion" but that the rule "did 
not mean that he invariably must do so." 113 Idaho at 571-72. 
Thus if the analysis were complete with the Courf s reading and interpretation of 
Nation> the Court would conclude that it was within the Court's discretion to determine 
whether or not to dismiss the motion for new trial or strike the same as requested by 
Athay. The Court would also refuse Athay's request to strike based upon the logic and 
holding in Nation. However, based upon the current state of the law the Court cannot 
conclude its analysis at this juncture. 
In the recent case of Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc. 2010 WL 5186683 
(Kuhn) the Idaho Supreme Court addressed this same issue. Although the Supreme Court 
did not address Nations directly, this Court can reach only one conclusion, that 
conclusion being that Kuhn has overruled the Court of Appeals holding in Nation. In 
Kuhn, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of an appellant's Rule 
59(a)(6) and (7) motion for new trial. In doing so it stated as follows: 
[i]n order to timely file a motion for new trial under subsections (6) and 
(7). the motion "must set forth the factual grounds therefore with 
particularity." Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7) (emphasis added). Appellants' 
motion for a new trial fails to provide any factual grounds, and only 
suggests that the motion "will be supported by a Memorandum in Support 
of Alternative Motions that will be filed with the Court." The judgment in 
this matter was filed on February 5, 2003. Appellants' new trial motion, 
which was strictly genetic in nature, was filed on February 14. It was not 
until May 5, 2003, that appellants flied their memorandum specifying the 
grounds for the motion, together with their supporting affidavits. Because 
there was not factual support filed in support of these motions within the 
fourteen-day period prescribed by the rule, the district court properly 
denied the motion. 
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2010 WL 5186683 at pA. Thus it appears that the holding in Kuhn is that a motion for 
new trial pursuant to LR.C.P. 59(a)(6) or (7) requires both that the motion be filed within 
fourteen days> and that the motion or brief in support of the motion must set forth a 
pa;rticularized statement of the factual grounds for the motion for a new trial also to be 
filed within fourteen (14) days after judgment has been entered. Further, the failure to do 
so is jurIsdictional and creates a fatal defect to the motion for a new trial. This is the 
conclusion that must be drawn from Kuhn. In fact in Kuhn the trial court denied the 
motion for a new trial on the merits of the motion and the Supreme Court noted that 
"although the court denied the motion based on the merits of appellants' olaim, it is well-
settled that '[w]here an order of a lower court is correct, but based on an erroneous 
theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory. >" 2010 \VL 5186683 at pA. 
Therefore, based upon the fact that Rich County's Motion for New Trial, although 
timely under LR.C.P. 59(b), is fatally flawed because it does not set forth with 
particularity the factual basis for its claim for new trial pursuant to the requirements of 
LR.C.P. 59(a)(7). Although Rich County did file a memorandum in support of its request 
for a new trial which contained a detailed and particularized statement of the grounds for 
the new trial, it was not filed within the required fourteen (14) days post entry of 
judgment. 
Therefore, the Court will GRANT Athay's Motion to Strike Motion for New 
Trial and Memorandum. 
2. RICH COUNTY'S RULE 59(a)(6) AND (7) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Based upon the Court's ruling on Athay's Motion to Strike Rich County's Motion 
for New Trial, the Court need not address the merits of Rich County's Motion for a New 
~8 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDElt ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR 
ALTERNATIVELY FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT· 5 
C . J 
Trial. Rich County's Motion for New Trial is STRICKEN and DISMISSED due to its 
procedural non-compliance with I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7). 
3. RICH COUNTY'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWlTHST ANDING THE VERDICT 
Rule 50(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure controls the analysis of a party's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict (IN.O.V.). Specifically, this rule 
provides that a motion for judgment N.O.V. shall be served not later than fourteen (14) 
days after entry of the judgment. A party may also bring such a motion without regard to 
whether or not that party made a motion for a directed verdict at the time of trial. 
In the present instance Rich County's alternative motion for J.N.O.V. was filed 
within fourteen (14) days of the Court entering judgment on the jury verdict. Therefore, 
the motion is timely and there are no procedural hurdles to this Court's consideration of 
the same. 
The trial court's responsibility when presented with a motion for IN.O.V. is 
discussed in Schwan IS Sales Enterprises v. Idaho Transp.} 142 Idaho 826, 830) 136 Idaho 
297, 301 (2006). 
When a trial judge receives such a motion, the judge begins the inquiry by 
asking him or herself whether there is substantial evidence in the record 
upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for the party against 
wham the judgment notwithstanding the verdict is sought. See Quick v. 
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763. 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). The judge's task 
in answering this question is to review all the evidence and draw all the 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Id at 764, 727 P .2d at 1192. (The party seeking a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict admits the truth of all the other side's evidence 
and every legitimate inference that can be drawn from it. Stephens v, 
Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-53) 678 P.2d 41, 44-45 (1984).) The judge is 
not an extra juror, though; there is no weighing of evidence or passing on 
the credibility of witnesses or making of independent findings on factual 
issues. Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 4, 592 P.2d 57, 60 (1979). Instead, 
the judge must determine whether the evidence is substantialHthat is, 
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whether it is of sufficient quality and probative value that reasonable 
minds could arrive at the same conclusion as did the jury. Mann v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736.518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974).2 
In the present case, Rich County asserts that this Court should enter a judgment in 
its favor despite the jury verdict in this matter. Rich County asserts two separate grounds 
for this Court to grant this relief. First, Rich County asserts that the Court should grant it 
J.N.O.V. because Athey's proof with respect to the liability of Sheriff Dale Stacey 
(Stacey), as a matter of law> is deficient. Second, Rich County asserts that the evidence 
regarding Athay's damages was insufficient to support an award of $2,720,126.00 in 
economic damages. The Court will address each of these contentions consistent with the 
standard of review for motions for J.N.O.V. 
A. Evidence of Reckless Disregard 
At the conclusion of Athay's case in chief, Rich County moved this Court for a 
directed verdict pursuant to Rille 50(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
motion was denied. The Court now having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, in 
light of the standard announced above, does find that there was substantial evidence in 
the record to support the jury's verdict finding that Stacey's conduct on the night in 
question did rise to the level of reckless disregard as that term has been defined by the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
l The Court does feel compelled to note that in Athay's briefing on this issue Athay has stated an incorrect 
standard of review for this Court. Athay cites to the case of Litchfield v. Ne/son, 122 Idaho 416, 835 P .2d 
651 (Ct,App.1992) for the proposition that the Court must apply a two part analysis. First, whether the 
verdict was against the weight of the evidence and second, if the ends of Justice would be served by 
vacating the verdict. See Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Opposition to Motion for a New Trial, pP. 8-9, § m. 
Athay further suggests that the Court is free to weigh the conflicting evidence. Id. at p. 9, § m. This 
standard of review enunciated by Athay is a correct standard of review for a motion for a new trial brought 
under I.RC.P. 59(a)(6) (insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict) but is not the correct standard for a 
motion for J.N.a,V. The Court has previously ruled that it is without jurisdiction to consider Rich 
County's motion for new trial under this rule of civil procedure due to procedural defects. 
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In Athay I and Athay II the Supreme Court set forth the standard for reckless 
disregard as that phrase is used in Idaho Code § 49~623(4).3 The Supreme Court 
enunciated the standard as follows: 
To constitute reckless disregard. the actor's conduct must not only create 
an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, Smith v. Sharp, 85 Idaho 17,27,375 
P .2d 184, 190 (1962), but, as we held in Athay L the actor must actually 
perceive the high degree of probability that harm will result and continue 
in his course of conduct. 142 Idaho at 365) 128 P.3d at 902. 
146 Idaho at 414. 
As stated above, the function of the Court on a motion for 1.N.O.V is not to act as 
a thirteenth juror. The Court is not to weigh the evidence or substitute its opinion 
concerning the evidence for that of the jurors. The sole function is to ascertain whether 
there is substantial evidence upon which the jury's verdict could rest. In this particular 
case, the Court concludes that there was substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
jury could have arrived at the conclusion it did with respect to Stacey's conduct. 
The facts introduced at trial establish the following facts which the jury could 
have relied upon to reach its conclusion that Stacey's conduct reached the level of 
reckless disregard: 
(1) Stacey initiated a stop of Daryl Ervin (Ervin) near Sage Creek 
Junction in Rich County, Utah. The purpose of the intended stop 
was due to erratic driving behavior and suspicion ofDUI; 
(2) However~ Ervin did not stop; instead he fled and a high speed pursuit 
ensued; 
(3) This pursui4 which began in Utah, continued through Wyoming and 
into Idaho; 
J This particular case has previously been to the Idaho Supreme Court on two separate occasions, The first, 
Athay v. Staoey, 142 Idaho 360, 128 PJd 897 (2005) is referred to as A/hay 1 and the second, Athay v. 
Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 196 P.3d 325 (2008) is referred to as Athay 11, 
o . J 
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(4) The testimony at trial established that it was between 63 to 66 miles 
from the scene of the attempted stop to the scene of the Athay/Ervin 
accident; 
(5) This pursuit involved law enforcement personnel from Rich County, 
Utah, Lincoln County, Wyoming and Bear Lake County> Idaho; 
(6) The pursuit involved speeds in excess of 96 miles per hour;4 
(7) The pursuit went through two population centers, Cokeville, 
Wyoming and Montpelier, Idaho; 
(8) The evidence established that this high speed pursuit was ongoing 
while there was other traffic on the road. In fact it was established 
that the utility of the spike strips was impaired because of other 
vehicles in close proximity to the strips when Ervin carne through 
that area; 
(9) The testimony established that the deployment of spike strips was not 
successful in stopping or even slowing the Ervin vehicle; 
(10) For a period of approximately eleven (11) miles the Ervin vehicle 
was driving on three (3) tires and the remnants of a fourth which had 
been destroyed during the spiking incident; 
(11) Despite the destruction of one of the tires on the Ervin vehicle, the 
high speed pursuit continued at speeds in excess of 96 miles per 
hour; 
(12) There was testimony that Ervin went through Montpelier, Idaho at 
high rates of speed; 
(13) There was testimony that at times, between the point where the spike 
strips were deployed and the accident occurred, Ervin was operating 
his vehicle without his headlights being activated; 
(14) There was testimony concerning a near collision between the Ervin 
vehicle and a truck being pulled into the Ranch Hand and testimony 
concerning Ervin's vehicle starting to fishtail as it accelerated after 
leaving Montpelier proper; 
4 Testimony at trIal indicated that Stacey's patrol vehicle had a governor which capped his speed at 96 
miles per hour. It waa also testified to that the Ervin vehicle would pull away from Stacey' 8 vehicle when 
Stacey's vehicle caught up to it. Examples of this testimony were in Cokeville, Wyoming when Stacey 
testified Ervin slowed to approximately 45 miles per hour and after getting his tire spiked Stacey again 
testified that Ervin slowed momentarily. As such the inference to be drawn from this testimony is that 
while Staoey did not exceed 96 miles per hour, Ervin did when he was pulling away from Stacey, 
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(15) Finally, Sheriff Stacey testified that he knew that there were risks to 
the traveling public involved in this high speed pursuit. 5 
Based upon these facts which were introduced at the time of trial, this Court must 
conclude that there was substantial evidence introduced by Athayat trial with respect to 
Stacei s conduct. The Court further finds that by accepting this evidence as true and 
allowing for aU reasonable inferences to be drawn from this evidence, which the Court 
must allow on a motion for J.N.O.V.> a reasonable jury could and did find that Stacey's 
conduct on the night in question amounted to reckless disregard. Therefore, the Court 
will not disregard the verdict of the jury and will not conc1ude l as a mater of law, that the 
evidence at trial did not rise to the level where the Court should have prevented it from 
being considered by the jury. As such, Rich County's Motion for J.N.O.V. as it relates to 
liability and the reckless disregard standard is DENIED. 
B. Evidence of Economic Damages 
Rich County also challenges the jury's award to Athay of economic damages in 
the sum of $2,720,126.00. Rich County argues that "even taking the Plaintiff's: 
projections of economic loss, projections of the present value of Plaintiff s life care plan, 
and the plaintiffs medical bills, it is unclear how the jury awarded $2,720.126.00,H 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, p. 20. Howeverl one never knows precisely how 
the jury reached its verdict It is within the province of the jury to decide what evidence 
it accepts and what evidence it disregards. Upon completion of this task, the jury is not 
5 In fairness to Stacey, he testified that in his professional judgment, the risks to the public were greater if 
he discontinued the pursuit and did not persist in the pursuit and remove this driver from the public 
highways. 
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required to provide an accounting concerning what evidence it felt to be compelling and 
therefore awarded damages and what evidence it found to be lacking and therefore did 
not award damages. 
What the Court must do on a motion for J.N.O.V. is evaluate the evidence 
submitted at trial and determine if there is substantial evidence sufficient to support the 
award of the jury. In this instance the Comt concludes that there has been substantial 
evidence introduced by the Plaintiff sufficient to justify the award by the jury in the 
amount of $21720.126.00. 
At trial the parties stipulated to Athay' s past medical bills in the sum of 
$111,763.34. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 124 which was admitted into evidence without 
objection. 
In support of his claim for damages, Athay called Helen M. Woodard to testify 
concerning a life care plan she had developed for Athay. She testified that she was a 
Rehabilitation Counselor and Life Care Planner. This life care plan was admitted into 
evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 137. In this life care plan, Ms. Woodard evaluated and 
gave her opinion on the future needs of Athay resulting from his paraplegia. These future 
needs were categorized into the following areas: (1) Medioal Evaluations; (2) Lab Testing 
and Bladder Supplies; (3) Medications; (4) Penile Implant Replacement; (5) Daily 
Assistance; (6) Psychological Services; (7) Case Management; (8) Rehabilitation 
Servioes; (9) Transportation; (10) Vocational Rehabilitation; (11) Equipment; and (12) 
Replacement Services. In combination with Athayl s economist, there was testimony that 
the~present value of these future needs and services was between $2,122,820.00 and 
$1,951.266.00. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 124. 
!5/</ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR 
ALTERNATIVELY FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ~ 11 
! I . j U1' 'n~1 IAili 17 : (, I I ~ 7 '17 I 'In ~ 
Athay also put on evidence of his claim regarding past lost earnings and loss of 
earning capacity. In support of this claim he called Jerome F. Sherman. Mr. Sherman 
testified concerning these issues. Plaintiff 5 Exhibit 144 was admitted into evidence and 
Mr. Sherman testified consistent with said exhibit. He opined that Athey's loss of 
earnings from the date of the accident through December 9, 2009 had been $207,977. He 
further opined that Athay's lost earning capacity amounted to $867,674 and that his lost 
fringe benefits amounted to $267,588. Finally, he testified that the present value these 
lost wages and fringe benefits were between $842,259 and $762,054. 
As a result of the foregoing, the evidence introduced by Athay at trial presented a 
claim for special damages in the amount of $3)076,342.00. The Court recognizes that 
many aspects of Atha.y's economic damages were vigorously challenged. In fact all 
aspects of it were aggressively challenged with the exception of Atbay's past medical 
expenses which were stipulated to by the parties. However, the Court's function is not to 
act as a third juror and substitute its opinion for that of the jury. N or is the Court to 
weigh the conflicting evidence. Rather, the Court must determine whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Although the Court does not know 
how the jury reached its award of economic damages, the Court does conclude that an 
award of $2,720)26.00 is ~ess than that total amount claimed and was supported by 
substantial evidence. Therefore, the Court must DENY Rich County's Motion for 
J.N.O.V. as it relates to Athay's claim for economic damages in the sum of 
$2,720,126.00. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court will GRANT Athay's Motion to Strike 
Motion for New Trial based upon the procedural defects t~ said motion. Therefore, the 
Court STRIKES Rich County's Motion for a New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and the memorandum in support of said motion. However, 
to the extent that the motion and memorandum deal with the alternative Motion for 
J.N,O.V. the same are not stricken. However, Rich County!s Motion for J.N.O.V is 
DENIED on the merits. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date below) I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the attorney(s) or person(s) listed below in the manner indicated. 
Attorney(s)lPersons(s): 
Craig R. Jorgensen 
Attorney at Law 
] 246 Yellowstone A venue, Suite A4 
Post Office Box 4904 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904 
Telephone: (208) 237 .. 4100 
Facsimile: (208) 237-1706 
Peter Stirba 
R. Blake Hamilton 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 750 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[)(J U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
DATED this £ day of February, 2011. 
KERRY HADDOCK 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: ~~gt~""~ 
De uty Clerk 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
KYLEATHAY, Case No. CV-2002-00000n 
Plaintiff, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v. 
RICH COUNTY, UT AB, 
Defendant. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, KYLE ATHAY, MTD THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEY, CRAIG R. JORGENSEN, 920 EAST CLARK, POCATELLO, IDAHO 83205-
4904, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE TITLED COURT. 
NOTICE OF ApPEAL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Rich County, Utah, appeals against the above named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in this matter on October 8, 
2010 and the Orders denying: 1) Rich County's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Further Brief in 
Opposition the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial; 2) Rich County's Motion for a New Trial 
and 3) Rich County's Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict entered in the above entitled action, Honorable Judge Mitchell W. Brown presiding. The 
last Order of the District Court was entered on February 14, 2011. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 11(a)(1), (5) and (6) ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends 
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. Did the District Court commit error in granting the Respondent's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment in ruling that Appellant's liability is not capped at $500,000.00 under I.C. 
§ 6-926. 
b. Did the District Court commit error in granting the Respondent certain 
costs as a matter of right despite finding that Respondent did not fully comply with I.R.C.P 
54(d)(5) and without reducing the amount of the costs awarded by the proportion of fault 
assigned to Rich County. 
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c. Did the District Court commit error in failing to reduce Respondent's 
award by the amount Respondent had previously collected from collateral sources. 
d. Did the District Court commit error in denying Appellant's Motion for 
Limited Disqualification of Judge in ruling that the Court could fairly and impartially make a 
determination concerning the Appellant's Motion for a New Trial. 
e. Did the District Court commit error in denying Appellant's Motion to 
Strike Respondent's Further Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Disqualification of 
Judge and Further Brief in Opposition to Motion for New Trial despite Respondent's failure to 
comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and in ruling that Appellant was not prejudiced 
by Respondent's untimely filing. 
f. Did the District Court commit error in denying Appellant's Motion for a 
New Trial in ruling that Appellant's Motion did not comply with the affidavit requirement of 
LR.C.P. 59 as interpreted by an Idaho Supreme Court decision that was issued on December 23, 
2010, after Appellant had filed and argued its Motion. 
g. Did the District Court commit error in denying Defendant's Motion for a 
New Trial by determining that despite fmding that an irregularity in the trial proceedings 
occurred, that neither party was prevented from having a fair trial because all four prongs of the 
Rueth standard had been met. 
h. Did the District Court commit error in granting Respondent's Motion to 
Strike Appellant's Motion for New Trial in ruling that Appellant's Motion was untimely under 
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Idaho law as set forth in an Idaho Supreme Court decision that was issued on December 23, 
2010, after Appellant had filed and argued its Motion. 
1. Did the District Court commit error in denying Appellant's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in ruling that there was sufficient evidence introduced at 
trial that a reasonable jury could conclude that Sheriff Stacey's conduct in question amounted to 
reckless disregard. 
J. Did the District Court commit error in denying Appellant's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in ruling that there was substantial evidence introduced at 
trial to support the jury's economic damages award. 
4. No portion of the record has been sealed. 
5. On August 18, 2010, Appellant requested a hard copy of the entire reporter's 
standard transcript including opening statements and closing arguments of counsel, the 
conference on requested instructions and special verdict form and objections to the same, and the 
court's ruling thereon. Appellant received the Transcript as requested on or about January 12, 
2011. 
Pursuant to LA.R. 26.1, Appellant requests the preparation of the above mentioned 
portions of the reporter's transcript in electronic format on a computer-searchable disk only. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a. 
b. 
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c. All requested and given jury instructions. 
d. The Trial Transcript, including opening statements and closing arguments 
of counsel, the conference on requested instructions and special verdict form, the parties' 
objections to the same and the court's ruling thereon. 
e. Transcripts of the following proceedings: 
1. September 16,2010 Telephonic Status Conference. 
11. November 4,2010 Hearing on Motion for Limited Disqualification 
of Judge. 
111. November 18,2010 Hearing on Motions. 
f. Pleadings on Plaintiff s Motion for Entry of Judgment: 
1. Motion for Entry of Judgment and Memorandum in Support 
Thereof and Exhibits A, B, C and D - Dated August 3,2010. 
11. Memorandum of Costs - Dated August 3, 2010. 
111. Defendant Rich County's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum Motion for Entry of Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof and 
Objections to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs - Dated August 17,2010. 
IV. Plaintiffs Reply BriefRe Entry of Judgment and Memorandum of 
Costs Dated August 18,2010. 
v. Plaintiffs Further Brief in Support of Entry of Judgment Dated 
August 26,2010. 
g. Pleadings on Defendant Rich County's Motion for a New Trial: 
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1. Defendant Rich County's Motion for a New Trial- Dated October 
1,2010. 
11. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Rich County's Motion for a 
New Trial- Dated October 1,2010. 
iii. Plaintiffs Reply Brief to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial -
Dated October 13,2010. 
IV. Affidavit of Kyle Athay - Dated October 13, 2010. 
v. Defendant Rich County's Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for a New Trial- Dated November 2,2010. 
VI. Affidavit of Blake Hamilton in Support of Motion for a New Trial 
- Dated November 2,2010. 
h. Pleadings on Defendant Rich County's Motion for Limited 
Disqualification of Judge: 
1. Defendant Rich County's Motion for Limited Disqualification of 
Judge - Dated October 22,2010. 
11. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Rich County's Motion for 
Limited Disqualification of Judge - Dated October 22, 2010. 
111. Affidavit of Blake Hamilton - Dated October 22,2010. 
IV. [plaintiff s] Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Limited 
Disqualification of Judge and Further Brief in Opposition to Motion for a New Trial -
Dated November 3,2010. 
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v. Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff s Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification of Judge and Further Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for a New Trial- Dated November 3, 2010. 
VI. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Strike Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Limited Disqualification 
of Judge and Further Brief in Opposition to Motion for a New Trial- Dated November 3, 
2010. 
1. Pleadings on Defendant Rich County's Motion for New Trial or 
Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict: 
1. Defendant Rich County's Motion for New Trial or Alternatively 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict - Dated October 22,2010. 
11. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Rich County's Motion for 
New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict - Dated November 
4,2010. 
111. Plaintiffs Reply BriefIn Opposition to Motion For A New Trial-
Dated November 12, 2010. 
IV. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Rich County's 
Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Dated 
November 16,2010. 
j. Copies of the following Subpoenas concerning Defendant Rich County's 
Motion for a New Trial: 
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L Subpoena (Kyle Athay) - Served November 9, 2010. 
11. Subpoena (Brandy Mann Peck) - Served November 12,2010. 
111. Subpoena Duces Tecum (T-Mobile) - Served November 5, 2010. 
IV. Subpoena Duces Tecum (Verizon Wireless) - Served November 
16,2010. 
k. Notice of Hearing Set for Thursday, September 16,2010 at 9:00 a.m. -
Dated September 13,2010. 
L The following Minute Entries, Memorandum Decisions and Orders: 
I. Minute Entry and Order Dated August 19, 2010 (delivered to 
parties on August 31, 2010.) 
11. Order - Dated August 31, 2010. 
111. Minute Entry and Order - Dated September 16,2010. 
IV. Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Entry 
of Judgment Dated October 7,2010. 
v. Minute Entry and Order - Dated November 4, 2010. 
vi. Minute Entry and Order - Dated November 18,2010. 
VII. Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Rich County's 
Motion for a New Trial- Dated February 1,2011. 
Vlll. Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Rich County's 
Motion for a New Trial- Dated February 14,2011. 
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m. Defense Exhibit "A" [Subpoenaed phone records of Kyle Athay from 
Verizon Wireless]; Introduced during November 18, 2010 Hearing on Motions. 
n. Summary of Defense Exhibit "A" [Subpoenaed phone records of Kyle 
Athay from Verizon Wireless]; Provided to the Court and all counsel in support of Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial on November 23,2010. 
7. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
a. All exhibits offered by either party and admitted at trial. 
8. I certifY: 
a. That a copy oftms notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
1. Dorothy Snarr (retired), P.O. Box 306, 112 South Main Street, 
Grace, Idaho, 83241. 
b. That the above-named court reporter has been paid for the preparation of 
the Trial Transcript and all other hearing transcripts requested by Appellant and set forth in 
Section 6( e )(i) - (iii), above. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
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DATED thisL'l day of March, 2011. 
NOTICE OF ApPEAL 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
PETER STIRBA 
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2'6 day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL by the method indicated below, to the 
following: 
Craig R. Jorgensen, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
920 East Clark Street 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904 
Alan Johnston 
PIKE HERNDON STOSICH & JOFINSTON 
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
District Judge - Resident Chambers 
P.O. Box 775 
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
Dorothy Snarr 
P.O. Box 306 
112 South Main Street 
Grace, Idaho, 83241 
NOTICE OF ApPEAL 
~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(.{u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
({u.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
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I, KERRY HADDOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bear Lake, do hereby certifY that the following is a list of the exhibits, 
offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
PLAINTIFF'S EXIllBITS: 
NO: DESCRIPTION: SENTIRETAINED 
101 Incident Report, Rich County sent 
102 Incident Report, Dale Stacey sent 
117 Pursuit Policy, Rich County sent 
124 Summary of Medical Bills sent 
125 Medical Bills, LDS Hospital sent 
126 Medical Bills, Mountain West Anesthesia sent 
128 Medical Bills, Equipment Expenses sent 
129 Medical Bills, Utah Radiology sent 
130 Medical Bills, Ambulance sent 
132 Medical Bills, Logan Urology sent 
133 Medical Bills, Bear Lake Memorial sent 
134 Medical Bills, Dr. Rees sent 
135 Medical Bills, University of Utah Hospital sent 
137 Life Care Plan, Helen Woodard sent 
138 Curriculum Vitae, Helen Woodard sent 
141 Accident Diagram and Report, Idaho State Police sent 
144 Report, Jerome Sherman sent 
154 Radio Log, Bear Lake County sent 
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DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS: 
NO: DESCRIPTION: SENT/RETAINED 
201 Rich County Dispatch Call Log sent 
202 Rich County Dispatch Audio Recording sent 
203 Rich County Dispatch Audio Transcript sent 
204 Lincoln County Dispatch Audio sent 
205 Lincoln County Dispatch Audio Transcript sent 
209 Dash Camera Video sent 
211-1 Photo, Sage Creek Junction sent 
211-2 Photo, Sage Creek Junction sent 
211-3 Photo, Sage Creek Junction sent 
212-1 Accident Scene Diagram(Du Val) sent 
212-2 DuVal Photo, Accident Location sent 
212-3 DuVal Photo, Accident Location, Wheel Rim Gouging on Rd sent 
212-4 DuVal Photo, Accident Location, Oncoming Vehicle Lane sent 
212-5 DuVal Photo, Accident Location, East Shoulder sent 
212-6 DuVal Photo, Athay Vehicle sent 
212-7 DuVal Photo, Ervin Vehicle sent 
213 Spiked Tire sent picture 
214 \\Theel Rim sent picture 
216 Stacey's Bear Lake County Deputy Sheriff Card sent 
218-1 Judgment of Conviction (certified copy) sent 
218-2 Affidavit of Probable Cause, W.D. Jones sent 
218-3 Affidavit of Probable Cause, Rex Skinner sent 
218-4 Influence Report sent 
218-5 Intoxilizer Results sent 
218-6 Statement of Miranda Rights and Questioning Form sent 
218-7 Idaho Uniform Citation sent 
219-1 Derk Rasmussen Demonstrative Summaries sent 
219-2 Cirricula Vitae of Derk Rasmussen sent 
220 Bear Lake Mental Health Records for Kyle Athay, 1999 sent 
221 Dr. Clay Campbell Medical Records for Kyle Athay, 1999-2006 sent 
222 Bear Lake County and Rich County Interlocal Agreement sent 
224-1 Post-Accident In-Patient Rehab Follow Up, 1130/2002 sent 
224-2 Post-Accident In-Patient Rehab Follow Up, 3/30/2004 sent 
224-3 Post-Accident In-Patient Rehab Follow Up, 8/02/2006 sent 
Possible Pressure Sore Evaluation 
224-4 Pressure Sore Evaluation Follow Up, 8/1812006 sent 
224-9 Post-Accident In-Patient Rehab Follow Up, sent 
New Wheelchair Evaluation 
227 Map sent 
228 Map sent picture 
229 Football Contract sent 
230 Drawing by Chad Ludwig sent 
231 Written Calculations sent 
A Subpoenaed Phone Records of Kyle Athay from Verizon 
Wireless and Summary of Exhibit "A" sent 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court this 
~ORday of May, 2011. 
(SEAL) 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
KERRY HADDOCK 
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I, KERRY HADDOCK, Clerk of the District COUli of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bear Lake, do hereby certifY that the foregoing Clerk's Record in the above 
entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents and papers designated to be included under Rule 28, JAR, the Notice of Appeal, any 
Notice of Cross-Appeal, and any additional documents requested to be included. 
I further certifY that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted as exhibits in the 
above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court with any Reporter's 
Transcript and the Clerk's Record, as required by Rule 3] of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court this 
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I, KAREN VOLBRECHT, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the 
State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Bear Lake, do hereby certifY that I have personally served or mailed, 
by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to 
each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
CRAIG R. JORGENSEN 
Attorney at Law 
p.o. Box 4904 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904 
Counsel for PlaintifflRespondent 
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ALAN JOHNSTON 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Resident Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
PETER STIRBA 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Non-Resident Counsel for Defendant! Appellant 
c2 ~ WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court this 
() day of May, 2011. 
(SEAL) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
KERRY HADDOCK, 
Clerk of e District Court 
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